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I. INTRODUCTION
Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, neither the federal
government nor the states may deny any person equal protection of the
laws.' There are two principal questions in equal protection cases. First,
whether the ends the government seeks to achieve by the classification are
constitutionally permissible; 2 and second, whether the means employed are
closely related enough to the otherwise permissible ends to justify the
distinction.3 In answering these questions the Supreme Court has articulated
three standards of review: rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict
scrutiny.4 One area of this tri-level equal protection jurisprudence that
continues to be troublesome is the application of intermediate scrutiny to
gender classifications. In theory, there are considerable differences between
intermediate scrutiny and either rationale basis review or strict scrutiny.
However, in practice its application has been problematic. For example, in
United States v. Virginia,5 seven members of the Court, purporting to apply
intermediate scrutiny, held that Virginia Military Institute's (VMI's)
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497, 499 (1954) (finding an equal protection component in the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause).
2. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). But cf WILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN D.
VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 679 (Foundation Press I Ith ed. 2001)
(pointing out that "[c]onstitutional law scholars are sharply divided on the question whether...
courts should examine ... both the means and the ends of legislation").
3. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
4. But cf R. Randall Kelso, Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Clause and
Related Constitutional Doctrines Protecting Individual Rights: The "Base Plus Six" Model and
Modern Supreme Court Practice, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 225, 226 (2002) (arguing that the Court's
cases "reflect" seven standards of review).
5. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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exclusion of women violated the Equal Protection Clause.6 However, in a
bitter dissent, Justice Scalia accused the Court of"a defacto abandonment of
the intermediate scrutiny that has been ... [the] standard for sex-based
classifications for some two decades."7 He maintained that the Court had, in
effect, applied strict scrutiny.'
The shoe was on the other foot in the Court's most recent gender case,
Nguyen v. INS.9 In that case the underlying question was the constitutionality
of a Congressional statute that placed greater requirements on unwed citizen
fathers, than on unwed citizen mothers with respect to conferring United
States citizenship on their offspring when the other parent is an alien.'0 All
of the Justices agreed that the statute created a gender classification and
intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review." The five
Justice majority upheld the classification, holding that it was substantially
related to the achievement of important govemmental interests. 2 The four
dissenters, however, complained that the majority had "deviat[ed]' 3 from
precedent and failed to apply the standard in a "rigorous"'
14 and "vigilan[t] '' 5
manner. They not so subtly implied that the majority had, in effect, not
applied intermediate scrutiny, but rational basis review.'
6
The dispute over the proper application of the standard of review in
Nguyen and Virginia is symptomatic of the fact that intermediate scrutiny is
a "made up" rule 17 that has had little effect on the outcome of the decisions.
,In reality, intermediate scrutiny in gender cases is a form of rational basis
review.' 8 In effect, the issues in the gender cases have been whether the
6. Id. at 519.
7. Id. at 574 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
8. See id. at 571-76.
9. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
10. Id. at 59-60.
11. See id. at 60-61, 74-75.
12. Id. at 60-61.
13. Id. at 97 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
14. Id. at 79.
15. Id. at 97.
16. See id. at 74-78.
17. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567, 570 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(characterizing the Court's tri-level equal protection jurisprudence as "made-up tests" that "are no
more scientific than their names suggest").
18. For an article reaching a similar conclusion, see George C. Hlavac, Equal Protection:
Interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause: A Constitutional Shell Game, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
1349, 1376 (1993) ("[A]ny special protection the intermediate-scrutiny test provides actually can be
provided by the rational-basis test."). See also Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 497 n.4
(1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that despite the articulation of different standards of
classifications at issue are based on legitimate differences between the
genders, or whether they are based on stereotypical "overbroad
generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males
and females";' 9 and, even if the former, whether the means are reasonably.
and rationally related to the ends. However, since the answers to these
questions are not always self-evident, they require reasoned analysis upon
which reasonable minds can, and do, differ. Consequently, in the end, the
results in the cases turn on how the Court and the individual Justices view
the underlying facts and policies, rather than on the verbalization of the
standard of review as intermediate scrutiny.
20
II. THE THEORETICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STRICT SCRUTINY,
INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY, AND RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW
In theory, there are considerable differences between rational basis
review, strict scrutiny, and intermediate scrutiny. Rational basis review is a
deferential standard.2' It is the base line standard of review in equal
22protection cases. It applies to all classifications not involving fundamental
rights or suspect classes.23 Under it, classifications are upheld if they bear a
reasonable2 4 or rational 25 relationship to a legitimate government purpose.
26
The rationale for rational basis review is that the Court is not a super-
review, in reality "the ultimate standard ... in all ... equal protection cases ... is essentially the
same"); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing the Court's
multi-tiered analysis:
does not describe a completely logical method of deciding cases, but rather is a method
the Court has employed to explain decisions that actually apply a single standard in a
reasonably consistent fashion[;] [and] ... a careful explanation of the reasons motivating
particular decisions may contribute more to an identification of that standard than an
attempt to articulate it in all-encompassing terms).
Chief Justice Burger may have also shared the view that there is only one standard of review in equal
protection cases. Justice Souter has said that "Chief Justice Burger's noncategorical approach is
probably best seen ... as reflecting his conviction that the treble-tiered scrutiny structure merely
embroidered on a single standard of reasonableness whenever an equal protection challenge required
a balancing of justification against probable harm." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 268 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).
19. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
20. But cf Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). Justice 0' Connor, writing
for a five Justice majority, opined that "when a classification expressly discriminates on the basis of
gender, the analysis and level of scrutiny... do[es] not vary simply because the objective appears
acceptable to individual Members of the Court." Id. at 724 n.9.
21. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11 (1992).
22. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632; Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at II.
23. Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 10.
24. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911); Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe R.R.
Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 155 (1897).
25. Romer, 517 U.S. at631.
26. See id.
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legislature.27 It is not the Court's role "to judge the wisdom, fairness, or
logic of legislative choices. ' 8 It is for other governmental decision makers
to decide what policies are needed.29 In developing and implementing such
policies, governments face practical problems.30 This may require them to
make "'rough accommodations' that may seem "'illogical' and
"'unscientific." '' 3' Therefore, if a classification does not involve fundamental
rights or suspect classes, 32 the scope of review should be narrow and
deferential,33 and the classification should be upheld as long as it is not
arbitrary.34
Thus, under rational basis review, there is a strong presumption in favor
of the validity of the classification. 35 Government decisions are "not subject
to courtroom factfinding, 36 and the rationality of the classification does not
have to be supported with evidence in the record.37 The government is not
required to state any basis for it at all.38 The Court may engage in "rational
speculation" 39 to determine if there is "any reasonably conceivable state of
facts"40 that could justify it.4 1 If there are "'plausible reasons'' 4 2 to support
its rationality, the classification is upheld even if the supposed reasons did
27. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
28. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
29. See Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303 (noting that it is not the Court's job "to judge the wisdom or
desirability of legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights
nor proceed along suspect lines").
30. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993).
31. Id. (quoting Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1913)).
32. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. at 313.
33. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
34. See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 79-80 (1911).
35. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. at 314.
36. Id. at 315.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id at 313.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 313-14 (quoting United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980)). On the
current Court, only Justice Stevens quibbles with this proposition. In his view, "'the Constitution
requires something more than merely a 'conceivable' or 'plausible' explanation."' Id. at 323 n.3
(Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Fritz, 449 U.S. at 180 (Stevens, J., concurring)). He asserts that the
inquiry should be "whether the classification is rationally related to 'a legitimate purpose that we
may reasonably presume to have motivated an impartial legislature."' Id. (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Fritz, 449 U.S. at 181 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
not in fact motivate the decision maker.43 Indeed, the Govemment's actual
purpose is said to be "irrelevant" for purposes of rational basis review.
44
Furthermore, government may legislate "one step at a time '45 and is not
required to solve "all evils of the same genus ... or none at all. 46
Government classifications do not have to be drawn perfectly. 47 A
classification is not unconstitutional merely because it "'is not made with
mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.' 48 It
will only be struck down when it "'rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the
achievement of the State's objective.' ' 49  Anyone challenging the
classification has "the burden 'to negative every conceivable basis which
might support it,' '5° or otherwise "must convince the court that the
legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based could not
reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental decisionmaker.
' 51
Consequently, governmental "'line-drawing' 52 is sometimes said to be
"virtually unreviewable. ''53
Strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny are forms of heightened
scrutiny.54 Strict scrutiny is the antithesis of rational basis review. Whereas
rational basis review is a "relatively relaxed standard' 55 of review, strict
scrutiny, as its name implies, is a strict standard. 6 Rational basis is applied
deferentially. 7 Under strict scrutiny, however, the Court takes a hard look to
determine the constitutionality of the classification. In rational basis review
the government's purpose must be only legitimate, 58 but in strict scrutiny the
43. Id. at 315.
44. Id. But see infra text accompanying notes 279-81.
45. Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
46. Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949).
47. See Hellerv. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993).
48. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas
Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)).
49. Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 71 (1978) (quoting McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,425 (1961)).
50. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake
Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)).
5 I. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979).
52. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. at 315 (quoting United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz,
449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980)).
53. Id. at 316. Nonetheless, rational basis review does have some bite. See infra notes 273-329
and accompanying text.
54. See City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985).
55. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976).
56. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (stating that strict scrutiny
requires "the strictest judicial scrutiny").
57. Romer v. Evans, 577 U.S. 620, 632 (1996); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11 (1992).
58. Romer, 517 U.S. at631.
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government's interests must be compelling.59 In addition, under rational
basis review the required fit between the means and the ends must be only
reasonable 60 or rational; 61 however, in strict scrutiny the fit must be narrowly
tailored.62
Intermediate scrutiny in gender cases also purports to be a form of
heightened, "'hard look' ' , 63 scrutiny. Under the verbalization of the standard,
classifications must be substantially related to important governmental
objectives.64 In intermediate scrutiny the Governmental purpose must be
more than simply legitimate as in rational basis review; it must be
important.65 However, the purpose need not be compelling as in strict
scrutiny. 66 Also, the fit between the means and the ends must be more than
merely reasonable or rational as in rational basis review; it must be
substantial.67 A substantial relationship is required "to assure that the
validity of a classification is determined through reasoned analysis rather
than through the mechanical application of traditional, often inaccurate,
assumptions about the proper roles of men and woman., 68 However, the
classification need not be as narrowly tailored as in strict scrutiny.
Nonetheless, the justification for the classification must be "'exceedingly
persuasive."' 69 The burden of establishing an "exceedingly persuasive
justification" is said to be "demanding[,] and it rests entirely on the State. 7°
Furthermore, unlike rational basis review, the Court will not engage in
rational speculation.7' The rationale for the classification "must be genuine,
not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation. 72 Also, "it
59. See Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 200.
60. See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas, Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911); Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe
R.R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 155 (1897).
61. SeeRomer, 517 U.S. at 631.
62. Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 227.
63. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 541 (1996).
64. Id. at 533.
65. Id.
66. Cf id. at 532 n.6 ("The Court has thus far reserved most stringent judicial scrutiny for
classifications based on race or national origin ... .
67. Id. at 533.
68. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725-26 (1982).
69. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
70. Id.
71. Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 460, n.7 (1981).
72. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents,
capacities, or preferences of males and females. 73
Of the Court's three levels of equal protection scrutiny, intermediate
scrutiny as applied to gender classifications is the most disconnected from
the intent and text of the Constitution. Strict scrutiny developed in the
context of race based classifications.74 It has its roots in the anti-slavery
origins of the Fourteenth Amendment.75 Although originally designed to
protect the newly freed slaves,76 the Court has held that it prohibits all
discrimination based on race,77  color, or national origin.7 8  Such
classifications are said to be inherently "suspect"7 9 since they are "more
likely to reflect racial prejudice than legitimate public concerns. 8 °
Furthermore, "'distinctions between citizens solely because of their
ancestry"' are by their very nature "'odious to a free people whose
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.",' 81 Consequently,
such classifications can only be upheld if they are "shown to be necessary to
the accomplishment of some permissible state objective, independent of the
racial discrimination., 82 Therefore, the Court must take a hard look at such
classifications so as to "'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race."
83
Admittedly, the Court has not always analyzed the cases consistently
with this purpose.84 In addition to extending strict scrutiny beyond
classifications that discriminate against Negroes to include all classifications
73. Id.
74. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) ("A core purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to do away with all governmentally imposed discrimination based on race.");
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967) ("The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the
States.").
75. See cases cited supra note 74.
76. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 81 (1872) ("We doubt very much whether any action of
a State not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their
race, will ever be held to come within the purview of [equal protection].").
77. In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995), a five to four majority of
the Court held that strict scrutiny applies to all race based classifications, even those designed as
affirmative action in favor of racial minorities, and regardless of whether they are created by federal,
state, or local governments.
78. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (stating that the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment "are universal in their application, to all persons.... without regard to any differences
of race, of color, or of nationality").
79. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.
80. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984).
81. Loving, 388 U.S. at II (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
82. Id.
83. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion).
84. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896) (stating that the Equal Protection
Clause only prohibits racial discrimination with respect to political and civil rights, not
discrimination with respect to social rights), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
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based on race, color, nationality,"85 and, in certain instances, aliens,86 it has
also applied equal protection principles against the federal government
through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,87 even though that
result seems inconsistent with the doctrine of original intent.88 Nonetheless,
strict scrutiny is consistent with the principle that the Constitution prohibits
discrimination against certain classes of persons in the absence of some
compelling interest. However, it seems quite certain that the drafters of the
Fourteenth Amendment never intended strict scrutiny to serve as the
standard of review for gender classifications.89
On the other hand, the Court recognized early on that the Equal
Protection Clause was phrased in universal terms and hence was not limited
to racial discrimination; on its face, it purports to protect all persons from a
denial of equal protection.90 However, the Court also recognized that not all
governmental classifications are invidious.91 Consequently, it developed the
principles of deferential rational basis review. Thus, classifications not
involving fundamental rights or suspect classes are presumed to be based on
some rational basis92 and are only struck down if shown to be arbitrary. 93
By contrast, intermediate scrutiny in gender cases is, in the words of
Justice Scalia, a "made-up '94 rule that made its first appearance in Justice
85. See case cited supra note 78.
86. Strict scrutiny has also been applied to classifications by the states that discriminate against
legal aliens with respect to economic interests. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971)
("Classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect
and subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class are a prime example of a 'discrete and
insular' minority for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate." (citation omitted)).
But cf Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n. 19 (1982) ("We reject the claim that 'illegal aliens' are a
'suspect class."'); Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439 (1982) ("While not retreating from
the position that restrictions on lawfully resident aliens that primarily affect economic interests are
subject to heightened judicial scrutiny, we have concluded that strict scrutiny is out of place when
the restriction primarily serves a political function." (citations omitted)); Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S.
67 (1976) (applying rational basis review to the exclusion of federal Medicare benefits to certain
lawfully admitted aliens).
87. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (finding an equal protection component in
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause).
88. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 83 (Touchstone Books 1997).
89. Id. at 328-31; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights
Amendments, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 161, 161-63.
90. See Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
91. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993).
92. Id. at 314-15.
93. Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
94. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567, 570 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(characterizing the Court's tri-level equal protection jurisprudence as "made-up tests" that "are no
more scientific than their names suggest").
Brennan's opinion for the Court in Craig v. Boren9' in 1976. It emerged as
an alternative standard after a majority of the Court rejected Justice
Brennan's argument in Frontiero v. Richardson96 that strict scrutiny should
be the standard of review in gender cases. The argument in favor of strict
scrutiny in such cases is that gender classifications can be, and have been,
used invidiously. 97 The country "has had a long and unfortunate history of
sex discrimination ... [that] was rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic
paternalism' which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in
a cage." 98 Historically, women suffered from disabilities similar to slaves,
being unable to "hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit in their own
names." 99 Women have also suffered "discrimination in our educational
institutions, in the job market[,] and ... in the political arena."' 00 This is
despite the fact that gender "is an immutable characteristic [that]...
frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society."''
Thus, gender classifications "carry the inherent risk of reinforcing the
stereotypes about the 'proper place' of women and their need for special
protection. ' 1 2
However, a majority of the Court has never accepted the argument that
gender classifications are necessarily inherently invidious,0 3 and therefore
should be subject to strict scrutiny. 0 4 Instead, they have taken the position
that such classifications can sometimes be reasonable and legitimate.'0 5 This
is based on the argument that, unlike race, "the sexes are not similarly
situated in certain circumstances."' 0 6 There are obvious differences between
men and women, and the Equal Protection Clause does not require "'things
which are different in fact ... to be treated in law as though they were the
same."' 107 Having lost the strict scrutiny argument, Justice Brennan seems to
95. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("[C]lassifications by gender must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.").
96. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-88 (1973) (plurality opinion).
97. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531-32.
98. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684 (plurality opinion).
99. Id. at 685.
100. Id. at 686.
101. Id.
102. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979).
103. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 79 (1981).
104. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 n.6 (1996) ("The Court has thus far reserved
most stringent judicial scrutiny for classifications based on race or national origin ...."); see also
Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 691-92.
105. See, e.g., Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (affirmative action for women).
106. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981) (plurality opinion).
107. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966) (alteration in original) (quoting Tigner v. Texas,
310 U.S. 141,147 (1940)).
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have created intermediate scrutiny as a way of ensuring heightened scrutiny
of gender classifications.'
A further indication of the made up quality of the rule is that, in theory,
it applies to all gender classifications, even those that discriminate against
males.'0 9 Clearly, there has been undeniable discrimination against females.
However, it is hard to make the case that males are any sort of suspect class
or, "because of past discrimination or peculiar disadvantages, are in need of
the special solicitude of the courts."' 10
III. IN PRACTICE THE APPLICATION OF INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY HAS BEEN
PROBLEMATIC
A. Introduction
Perhaps, in part, because of its made up quality, the application of
intermediate scrutiny in gender cases has proved problematic in practice.
For one thing, it has only been grudgingly accepted as the articulated
standard of review. Although the Court began to change its attitude towards
gender classifications in 1971,"' it was not until 1977 that a majority of the
Court unequivocally accepted intermediate scrutiny as the articulated
standard;112 and, it is only since 1982 that it has been the consistent standard
of a majority of the Court. 1 3 Furthermore, it was not until 2001 in Nguyen,
108. See also Hlavac, supra note 18, at 1366 (arguing that, in Craig v. Boren, "Justice Brennan
simply took the traditional 'rational-basis' test of Reed [v. Reed] and gave it a new set of teeth,
creating a somewhat heightened standard of review without providing a rationale for adopting the
standard").
109. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718
(1982); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
110. Michael M, 450 U.S. at 476.
Ill. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
112. The first gender case in which a majority of the Court unequivocally applied intermediate
scrutiny was Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1977). It has been suggested that the Court
has applied intermediate scrutiny in gender classifications since 1976 in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976). See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 558 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring). However, in Craig, only four Justices unequivocally applied that standard. See Craig,
429 U.S. at 197-98; Id. at 214 (Blackmun, J., concurring in pertinent part). Five members of the
Court were still not ready to do so. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 210-11 (Powell, J., concurring); Id. at
211-14 (Stevens, J., concurring); Id. at 214-15 (Stewart, J., concurring); Id. at 215-17 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); Id. at 217-28 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also infra notes 660-75 and accompanying
text.
113. A majority of the Court did apply intermediate scrutiny in a number of cases between 1977
and 1981. See Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 460-61 (1981); Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins.
the Court's most recent gender case, that all nine Justices unequivocally
purported to apply the standard. 14 In the interim, various Justices applied
11 16 11 7strict scrutiny,115 intermediate scrutiny,' rational basis review, or a
"sufficiently related" standard" 8 as the standard of review in gender cases;
and sometimes some Justices failed to articulate any particular standard of
review at all.'' 9
Even when the Court, or at least a substantial majority, has applied
intermediate scrutiny in gender cases, its application has sometimes been
problematic. For example, in United States v. Virginia, Justice Ginsburg,
writing for the majority,"' seemed to de-emphasize the standard. She gave
only lip service to the proposition that gender classifications must be
substantially related to important government objectives.' 2' Instead, she
emphasized the notion that such classifications require heightened scrutiny
and must have an exceedingly persuasive justification. 22 In a concurring
Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150-53 (1980); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388-94 (1979); Parham v.
Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 353-58 (1979); cf Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979) (stating
in dictum that intermediate scrutiny is the standard of review in gender cases); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S.
268, 279 (1979) (same). However, a majority failed to apply the standard in Michael M v. Superior
Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981), and Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). Nonetheless, a majority
returned to the standard in 1982 in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-
33 (1982). A majority of the Court also applied intermediate scrutiny in United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515, 531-34 (1996), and JE.B. v. Alabama ex rel. TB., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994). Cf
Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
114. But cf United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); infra notes 120-29 and accompanying
text. In Hogan, a majority purporting to apply intermediate scrutiny struck down a statute that
excluded males from taking courses for credit at a state nursing school. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 719.
Three dissenters thought that rational basis review was the appropriate standard. Id. at 742 (Powell,
J., dissenting). However, they argued that the exclusion of males was constitutional even under
intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 743-44 (Powell, J., dissenting). One dissenter did not clearly apply any
particular standard. Id. at 733-35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, stated in dictum that the substantial interest test was the
standard of review in gender cases, but he did not apply the standard. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 273.
Instead, the holding in the case was that the challenger had failed to establish that the classification
at issue had a "gender-based discriminatory purpose." Id. at 276-80. Justice Stevens, joined by
Justice White, concurred "in the Court's opinion." Id. at 281 (Stevens, J., concurring). Only Justice
Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissenting, applied the standard. Id. at 286-88 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
115. See infra notes 399, 513-14, 521-22, 549 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 353-58, 365-69, 378, 422-23,440-59, 494-96, 538, 541, 558-60, 603-05, 613-
17, 627-31, 643-44, 660-63, 679-82, 723-27 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 343-52, 400, 411-21,424, 489-93, 503-05, 515-20, 543-49, 610, 666-69, 713-
14 and accompanying text; see also infra note 642.
118. See infra notes 472-73, 525-26 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 114 and accompanying text; infra notes 358, 370, 469, 675; infra notes 425-
26, 536-37, 690-92 and accompanying text.
120. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996). Justice Thomas took no part in the case.
Id. at 558.
121. Id.at533.
122. Id. at 534, 545-46, 556.
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opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed the view that the majority's
emphasis on requiring the State to establish an exceedingly persuasive
justification "introduce[d] an element of uncertainty respecting the
appropriate test" in gender cases.123 He noted that the "traditional, 'firmly
established '"1 24 test in gender cases is that the classification must be
substantially related to important government objectives.125 In his view, "the
phrase 'exceedingly persuasive justification' ... is best confined, as it was
first used, as an observation on the difficulty of meeting the applicable test,
not as a formulation of the test itself.'' 2 6 Justice Scalia, the lone dissenter,
held that none of the Court's "made-up tests"'' 27 could "displace
longstanding national traditions as the primary determinant of what the
Constitution means,"'' 28 and that, in any event, the classification at issue was
constitutional even under intermediate scrutiny "honestly" applied. 1
29
B. Nguyen v. INS
Even in Nguyen the application of intermediate scrutiny was
problematic. In that case, the Court, in a five to four decision, upheld a
congressional statute that placed greater requirements on unwed citizen
fathers than on unwed citizen mothers with respect to conferring United
States citizenship on their offspring born outside the United States and its
possessions when the other parent was an alien.' 30 An unwed citizen mother
could confer United States citizenship on such children simply by being a
United States national at the time of birth and having been "'physically
present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions for a
continuous period of one year."" 31 However, an unwed citizen father could
only confer United States citizenship on such children if, in addition to the
requirements for unwed citizen mothers:
"a blood relationship between the person and the father [was]
established by clear and convincing evidence .... the father (unless
123. Id. at 559 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. (quoting Pets. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)).
127. Id. at 570 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 59-60 (2001).
131. Id. at 60 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (2001)).
deceased) ha[d] agreed in writing to provide financial support for
the person until the person reaches the age of 18 . . ., and ... while
the person [was] under the age of 18 years--(A) the person [was]
legitimated under the law of the person's residence or domicile, (B)
the father acknowledge[d] paternity of the person in writing under
oath, or (C) the paternity of the person [was] established by
adjudication of a competent court."' 132
The principal issue in the case was the constitutionality of the latter
requirement that the father, but not the mother, take one of three actions
prior to the child's eighteenth birthday.
33
All of the Justices agreed that the statute created a gender classification
and that intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review.
34
However, ostensibly they disagreed over the proper application of the
standard to the facts of the case. Justice Kennedy, writing for the five Justice
majority, held that the statute was constitutional. 35 He concluded that it was
substantially related to important governmental objectives, and the
justifications for it were "exceedingly persuasive."' 3 6 Justice O'Connor,
writing for the four dissenters, concluded that the classification was not
substantially related to important governmental objectives and lacked "an
exceedingly persuasive justification."'37
1. The Issues That Divided the Court
The first issue that divided the Court was whether the statute's alleged
purposes were in fact its actual purposes. Justice Kennedy concluded that
Congress had two purposes in requiring unwed fathers, but not unwed
mothers, to take certain steps prior to the child's eighteenth birthday in order
to confer citizenship on the child. The first was "assuring that a biological
parent-child relationship exists."' 38 The second was:
to ensure that the child and the citizen parent have some
demonstrated opportunity or potential to develop not just a
relationship that is recognized, as a formal matter, by the law, but
132. Id. at 59 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (2001)).
133. Id. at 60-62.
134. Id. at 60-61, 73-75.
135. Id. at 58-59.
136. Id. at 60-61, 70.
137. Id. at 74 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 62.
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one that consists of the real, everyday ties that provide a connection
between child and citizen parent and, in turn, the United States.
139
Justice O'Connor, writing for the dissenters, maintained that the
majority did not "demonstrate" that either of these purposes were in fact "the
actual purposes" of the statute. 40 As to the first articulated purpose, she
noted that the Government did not appear to assert it as one of the statute's
objectives, 141 and, as to the second, she asserted that it "appear[ed] to be the
type of hypothesized rationale that is insufficient under heightened
scrutiny.' 42 Justice Kennedy responded that in determining "the objectives
of Congress... [w]e ascertain the purpose of a statute by drawing logical
conclusions from its text, structure, and operation.'
143
The Court was also divided as to whether the asserted purposes, even if
the actual purposes, were important enough to justify the gender distinction.
With respect to the first interest, Justice Kennedy seemed to assume that the
Government had an important interest in awarding citizenship to an alien,
who claims to be the child of an unwed United States citizen, only upon
assurance that a biological relationship exist between them. 44 However,
Justice O'Connor complained that the majority did not "elaborate" on why it
was important to assure that a biological relationship exist between the alien
139. Id. at 64-65. Justice Kennedy reasoned that "[t]he mother knows that the child is in being and
is hers and has an initial point of contact with him." Id. at 65. Consequently, "[t]here is at least an
opportunity for mother and child to develop a real, meaningful relationship ... [that] inheres in the
very event of birth . I..." d  However, unlike the mother, the father may not be present at birth or
even "know that a child was conceived." Id. at 64-65. This is "a realistic possibility" that "principles
of equal protection do not require Congress to ignore," especially as to children born outside the
United States "in light of the number of Americans who take short sojourns abroad," and the
numbers of "military personnel ... stationed in foreign countries." Id. at 65-66. Therefore, "there is
no assurance that the father and his biological child will ever meet." Id. at 66. Consequently,
"[w]ithout an initial point of contact with the child by a father who knows the child is his own, there
is no opportunity for the father and child to begin a relationship." Id. Thus, the statutory requirement
that the father take one of three actions ("legitimation; ... paternity under oath ... ; or a court order
of paternity") prior to the child's eighteenth birthday, id. at 62, was an "unobjectionable," id. at 67,
and "unremarkable" way of "ensuring that such an opportunity, inherent in the event of birth as to
the mother-child relationship, exists between father and child before citizenship is conferred upon
the latter." Id. at 66. Furthermore, Justice Kennedy argued that "[t]he importance of the
governmental interest at issue here [was] too profound to be satisfied merely by conducting a DNA
test" since "scientific proof of biological paternity does nothing, by itself, to ensure contact between
father and child during the child's minority." Id. at 67.
140. Id. at 78-79, 84 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 79 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 84 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 67-68.
144. See id. at 62-64.
199
child and the unwed parent. 145 Nonetheless, she conceded that "the
importance of this interest.., presumably lies in preventing fraudulent
conveyances of citizenship."1
46
Justice Kennedy also thought that the second asserted statutory purpose,
"ensur[ing] that the child and the citizen parent have some demonstrated
opportunity or potential to develop.., a relationship... that consists of the
real, everyday ties that provide a connection between child and citizen
parent and, in turn, the United States,"'' 47 was important given "[t]he ease of
travel and the willingness of Americans to visit foreign countries"' 48 and the
fact that there are large numbers of "active duty military personnel" serving
overseas. 149 He reasoned that under these circumstances:
Congress is well within its authority in refusing, absent proof of at
least the opportunity for the development of a relationship between
citizen parent and child, to commit this country to embracing a child
as citizen entitled as of birth to the full protection of the United
States, to the absolute right to enter its borders, and to full
participation in the political process. 5°
Justice O'Connor responded that even if "Congress was actually
concerned about ensuring a 'demonstrated opportunity' for a relationship, it
[was] questionable whether such an opportunity qualifies as an 'important'
governmental interest apart from the existence of an actual relationship."'
' 51
She argued that in this context what is important is existence of "an actual
relationship.., regardless of when and how the opportunity for that
relationship arose," not the potential for a relationship. 152 As she saw it, a
"child's never-realized 'opportunity' for a relationship with the citizen
seems singularly irrelevant to the appropriateness of granting citizenship to
that child."' 53
Justice Kennedy rejoined that "Congress would of course be entitled to
advance the interest of ensuring an actual, meaningful relationship in every
case before citizenship is conferred."' 154 However, "[i]nstead, Congress
enacted an easily administered scheme to promote the different but still
145. Id. at 79 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 65.
148. Id. at 66.
149. Id. at 65.
150. Id. at 67.
151. Id. at 84 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 85 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 69.
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substantial interest of ensuring at least an opportunity for a parent-child
relationship to develop," and, the statute "should not be invalidated because
Congress elected to advance an interest that is less demanding to satisfy than
some other alternative.'
55
The Court was also divided on the issue of whether the means were
substantially related to the ends. As to the first objective, Justice Kennedy
thought the means of putting a greater burden on unwed fathers than on
unwed mothers was substantially related to the end of proving paternity
because men and women "are not similarly situated with regard to the proof
of biological parenthood. 1 56 The mother's relationship to the child "is
verifiable from the birth itself' and can be "documented in most instances by
the birth certificate or hospital records and the witnesses who attest to her
having given birth. 1 57 On the other hand, the father might not attend the
birth, and, even if he does, his presence alone does not establish paternity. 58
Thus, the additional requirement "for a father seeking to establish paternity -
legitimation, paternity oath,... [or] court order of paternity - [was] designed
to ensure an acceptable documentation of paternity.', 59 Furthermore, even
under a gender-neutral statute, fathers sometimes would have to take
additional actions to prove paternity than mothers who, because they are the
ones who give birth, can produce birth certificates, hospital records, and
witnesses.160 Consequently, Justice Kennedy thought that, given the
"biological difference between the parents,"' 61 the statutory scheme was
"reasonable"' 62 and "sensible... given the unique relationship of the mother
to the event of birth"'
' 63
Justice O'Connor disagreed. She found that "the fit between [the
statute's] discriminatory means and the asserted end" was "insufficien[t]."'
' 64
Her basic point was that requiring men, but not women, to take one of three
actions, "legitimation.... paternity... oath, or an adjudication of
paternity," prior to the alien child's eighteenth birthday "accomplishes"
nothing "in furtherance of 'assuring that a biological parent-child
155. Id.
156. Id. at 63.
157. Id. at 62.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 63.
160. Id. at 64.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 63.
163. Id. at 64.
164. Id. at 80 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
relationship exists' that [the statute] does not achieve on its own."' 165 She
pointed out that the statute on its face also required proof of paternity "'by
clear and convincing evidence."",166 She argued that such evidence could be
supplied by DNA testing, which, "in addition to providing accuracy
unmatched by other methods of establishing a biological link, essentially
negates the evidentiary significance of the passage of time.' 6 7
Consequently, she concluded the additional burdens placed on men did not
"substantially further[] the assurance of a blood relationship.', 168
Justice Kennedy rejected this argument. He responded that the statute
did not require DNA testing, and its "expense, reliability, and
availability... in various parts of the world may have been of particular
concern to Congress.' 69 More fundamentally, he held that "[t]he
Constitution... does not require that Congress elect one particular
mechanism from among possible methods of establishing paternity, even if
that mechanism arguably might be the most scientifically advanced
method."'170 Justice O'Connor rejoined that the latter argument "would have
much greater force" if the "rational basis" test was the appropriate standard
of review.' 7
Justice Kennedy also thought that requiring fathers, but not mothers, to
take certain steps prior to the child's eighteenth birthday was substantially
related to the statute's second objective, "facilitation of a relationship
between parent and child."'172 He held that "[i]n this difficult context of
conferring citizenship on vast numbers of persons[,] ... [t]he fit between the
means and the important end is 'exceedingly persuasive."" 73 Justice
O'Connor disagreed. She argued that even if ensuring "'an opportunity for a
parent-child relationship [to develop] during the formative years of the
child's minority"' is an important interest, "it is difficult to see how the
requirement that proof of such opportunity be obtained before the child turns
18 substantially furthers the asserted interest."' 174 She noted that "it is
entirely possible that a father and child will have the opportunity to develop
a relationship and in fact will develop a relationship without obtaining the
proof of the opportunity during the child's minority."'175 In addition, it is also
165. Id. (citation omitted).
166. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(1) (2001)).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 63.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 83 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 68.
173. Id. at 70.
174. Id. at 85 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Id. at 68).
175. Id.
202
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possible for a child to obtain "'an adjudication of paternity' on his own,
"'absent any affirmative act by the father, and perhaps even over his express
objection."'176 Thus, she concluded that "[t]he fact that the means-end fit can
break down so readily in theory, and not just in practice, is hardly
characteristic of a 'substantial' means-end relationship.' 77
Justice Kennedy responded that "it should be unsurprising that," "[i]n
furtherance of the desire to ensure some tie between this country and one
who seeks citizenship," "Congress decided to require that an opportunity for
a parent-child relationship occur during the formative years of the child's
minority.', 178 In addition, he asserted that the Court's gender cases did not
require "that the statute under consideration must be capable of achieving its
ultimate objective in every instance."'' 79 He also argued that, even if "one
conceives" the congressional purpose to be to assure:
the establishment of a real, practical relationship of considerable
substance between parent and child in every case[,] ... [i]t is almost
axiomatic that a policy which seeks to foster the opportunity for
meaningful parent-child bonds to develop has a close and
substantial bearing on the governmental interest in the actual
formation of that bond. 80
Justice O'Connor rejoined that "the Court's reasoning hardly conforms
to the tailoring requirement of heightened scrutiny."'' She said that "[a]
bare assertion of what is allegedly 'almost axiomatic' .. . is no substitute for
the 'demanding' burden of justification borne by the defender of the
classification."'' 8 1 She asserted that the "fact that a discriminatory policy
embodies the good intention of 'seek[ing] to foster' the opportunity for
something beneficial to happen is of little relevance in itself to whether the
policy substantially furthers the desired occurrence.' 83 In her view, "the
classification's defender" must prove the point, 184 and "[t]he majority's
176. Id. (quoting Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 486 (1998)).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 68.
179. Id. at 70.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 87 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
182. Id. (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)).
183. Id. (alteration in original).
184. Id.
sweeping claim is no surrogate for careful application of heightened scrutiny
to a particular classification.
185
The Court was also divided on whether the classification was based on a
stereotype that could have been avoided by the use of gender-neutral
alternatives and the extent to which the classification could be justified
based on administrative convenience. Justice Kennedy began by arguing that
"to require Congress to speak without reference to the gender of the parent
with regard to its objective of ensuring a blood tie between parent and child
would be to insist on a hollow neutrality."' 86 As to the first objective,
assuring that a biological parent-child relationship exists, he conceded that
Congress could have created a gender-neutral statute that required both
parents to prove paternity within a specified time after birth. 87 However, he
pointed out that, even under such a statute, fathers sometimes would have to
take additional actions to prove paternity than mothers who, because of their
presence at birth, can produce documentation and witnesses. 188 As he saw it,
"[t]he issue... [was] not the use of gender specific terms instead of neutral
ones" since "[j]ust as neutral terms can mask discrimination that is unlawful,
gender specific terms can mark a permissible distinction. '8 9 Instead, the
issue was "whether the distinction [was] lawful."' 190 He concluded that given
the "biological difference between the parents" with respect to "the unique
relationship of the mother to the event of birth," the use of "gender specific
terms" was "sensible."' 19'
As to the second objective, ensuring an opportunity for a relationship,
Justice Kennedy seemed to concede that Congress could have created a
gender-neutral scheme that would "excuse compliance with the formal
requirements when an actual father-child relationship [was] prove[n].', 92 It
did not, "perhaps because of the subjectivity, intrusiveness, and difficulties
of proof that might attend an inquiry into any particular bond or tie."' 93
Rather, it "enacted an easily administrated scheme to promote the different
but still substantial interest of ensuring at least an opportunity for a parent-
child relationship to develop;' ' 194 and the statute "should not be invalidated
185. ld. at 87-88.
186. Id. at 64.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 69.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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because Congress elected to advance an interest that is less demanding to
satisfy than some other alternative."'
' 95
Justice O'Connor argued that the majority had not given sufficient
weight to the availability of "sex-neutral alternatives" with respect to both
asserted objectives. 196 She maintained that "under heightened scrutiny, the
availability of sex-neutral alternatives to a sex-based classification is often
highly probative of the validity of the classification,"' 197 and "[i]n ... prior
cases ... has been a powerful reason to reject a sex-based classification."'' 98
She also asserted that the Court has "repeatedly rejected efforts to justify
sex-based classifications on the ground of administrative convenience."
'1 99
As to the first objective, she pointed out that even the majority
recognized that Congress could have required both parents to prove paternity
within a specified time after birth.200 In her view, such a gender-neutral
provision would not be a "hollow" requirement.20' She conceded that in
many cases "it will likely be easier for mothers to satisfy a sex-neutral proof
of parentage requirement,, 20 2 but argued that this may not always be the
case.20 3 She pointed out that "a mother will not always have formal legal
documentation of birth because a birth certificate may not issue or may
subsequently be lost ... [while] a father's name may well appear on a birth
certificate. ''2° Furthermore, she argued that:
"[w]hile it is doubtless true that a mother's blood relation to a child
is uniquely "verifiable from the birth itself' to those present at
birth,... the majority ha[d] not shown that a mother's birth relation
is uniquely verifiable by the... [Government], much less that any
195. Id.
196. Id. at 82 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 78 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142,
151 (1980); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281 (1979); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653
(1975)).
198. Id. at 82 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 88 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Wengler, 446 U.S. at 152; Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973)).
200. Id. at 81 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 82 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 81-82 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 81 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
greater verifiability warrants a sex-based, rather than a sex-neutral,
statute.205
In addition, Justice O'Connor thought that there were "available sex-
neutral alternatives" that could achieve the "asserted end ' '206 of ensuring "'an
opportunity for a parent-child relationship... [to develop during] the
formative years of the child's minority.' 20 7 These could include a "sex-
neutral requirement of presence at birth, knowledge of birth, or contact
,,208 hro,"obbetween parent and child prior to a certain age, or proof thereof, "to be
one way of demonstrating an opportunity for a relationship., 20 9 In her view:
the idea that a mother's presence at birth supplies adequate
assurance of an opportunity to develop a relationship while a
father's presence at birth does not would appear to rest only on an
overbroad sex-based generalization 210... "that mothers are
significantly more likely than fathers. .. to develop caring
relationships with their children."21'
She noted that "a mother may not have an opportunity for a relationship
if the child is removed from his or her mother on account of alleged abuse or
neglect, or if the child and mother are separated by tragedy, such as disaster
or war . 2.. " 12 Consequently, "[t]here is no reason, other than stereotype, to
say that fathers who are present at birth lack an opportunity for a relationship
on similar terms." 213 She also made the more macro point that the statutory
scheme at issue was "paradigmatic of a historic regime that left women with
responsibility, and freed men from responsibility, for nonmarital
children."
214
Justice Kennedy responded that the classification was not based on a
stereotype, which he defined as "a frame of mind resulting from irrational or
uncritical analysis. '215 He asserted that:
205. Id. at 81-82 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Id. at 62).
206. Id. at 86 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 85 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Id. at 68).
208. Id. at 88 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 86 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 482 (1998)
(Breyer, J., dissenting)).
212. Id. at 86 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 87 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 92 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 68.
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[t]here is nothing irrational or improper in the recognition that at the
moment of birth-a critical event in the statutory scheme and in the
whole tradition of citizenship law-the mother's knowledge of the
child and the fact of parenthood have been established in a way not
guaranteed in the case of the unwed father.21 6
Justice O'Connor rejoined that a classification may be based on an
unconstitutional stereotype even if it "may enjoy empirical support and thus
be in a sense 'rational.' 217 She noted that "in numerous cases where a
measure of truth has inhered in the generalization, 'the Court has rejected
official actions that classify unnecessarily and overbroadly by gender when
more accurate and impartial functional lines can be drawn.' '21 8 The question
is not whether the classification "'show[s] disrespect' for a class" or is
"insulting." '21 9 The question is "whether it 'relies upon the simplistic,
outdated assumption that gender could be used as a 'proxy for other, more
germane bases of classification.'
2 0
Justice Kennedy also pointed out that "[i]n analyzing ... [the statute][,]
[the majority was] mindful that the obligation it imposes with respect to the
acquisition of citizenship by the child of a citizen father is minimal. 2 21 He
said that "[t]his circumstance show[ed] that Congress has not erected
inordinate and unnecessary hurdles to the conferral of citizenship on the
children of citizen fathers in furthering its important objectives. 222 Justice
O'Connor responded that "[e]ven assuming that the burden is minimal...,
it is well settled that 'the "absence of an insurmountable barrier" will not
redeem an otherwise unconstitutionally discriminatory law."' 223
216. Id.
217. Id. at 89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 90 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 460 (1998)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 90 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 726 (1982)).
221. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 70.
222. Id. at 70-71.
223. Id. at 93-94 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461
(1981), in turn quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 774 (1977)). For articles essentially
agreeing with the dissenters' criticisms of the majority opinion, see Rachel K. Alexander, Nguyen v.
INS: The Supreme Court Rationalizes Gender-Based Distinctions in Upholding an Equal Protection
Challenge, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 789 (2001); Lica Tomizuka, The Supreme Court's Blind Pursuit
of Outdated Definitions of Familial Relationships in Upholding the Constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. §
1409 in Nguyen v. INS, 20 LAW & INEQ. 275 (2002).
2. Critique of Justice O'Connor's Dissenting Opinion
Justice O'Connor had two related overarching doctrinal criticisms of the
majority opinion. The first was that the majority had "deviat[ed], 2 4 from
precedent by failing to apply intermediate scrutiny in the "rigorous ' 225 and
"vigilan[t] ' '226 manner required in gender cases. The second was to the effect
that the majority had not applied intermediate scrutiny at all, but rather had
applied rational basis review.227 Justice O'Connor's first criticism is
misplaced. The fact is that, in many ways, the majority opinion is consistent
with the precedents that have purported to apply intermediate scrutiny.
For example, Justice Kennedy found the statutory purpose "by drawing
logical conclusions from its text, structure, and operation., 221 Justice
O'Connor asserted that in this regard the majority had engaged in "the type
of hypothesized rationale that is insufficient under heightened scrutiny.
229
However, it seems clear that in purporting to apply intermediate scrutiny, the
Court may make its own independent inquiry into actual purposes. Under
rational basis review, the Court can engage in rational speculation to
determine the statutory purpose; 230 and, the classification can be upheld even
if the supposed reasons did not in fact motivate the decision maker.23' By
contrast, in theory, under intermediate scrutiny, the burden is on the
defender of the classification to establish the government's actual purpose.
232
In practice, this has meant the Court does not have to accept at face value the
government's asserted purpose. Thus, in Califano v. Goldfarb, Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority and purporting to apply intermediate
scrutiny,2 33 rejected the "govemment-proffered purposes after 'inquiry into
the actual purposes.' 2 34 He determined the statute's actual purpose by
examining its "phrase[ology][,] ... general scheme[,] ... [and] legislative
history. 235 Similarly, in United States v. Virginia, Justice Ginsburg, writing
for the majority and purporting to apply intermediate scrutiny, also rejected
one of the government's asserted objectives after a "'searching analysis.' 236
224. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 97 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 79 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 97 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
227. See id. at 74-78 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 67-68.
229. Id. at 84 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
230. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).
231. Id.
232. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
233. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 210-11 (1977).
234. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 536 (quoting Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 212).
235. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 213-14; see also id at 216-17.
236. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 536 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 727
(1982)).
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She found that "[n]either recent nor distant history" supported the
government's alleged justification.2 37 The notion that, in gender cases, the
Court may make "inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory
scheme" was first asserted in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld.23' Although that
case appeared to apply the rational basis test,239 the decision has been cited
with approval in cases purporting to apply intermediate scrutiny.240
It is true that the majority hypothesized about why Congress did not
adopt a different law. They speculated that Congress did not rely on DNA
testing as proof of paternity because "the expense, reliability, and
availability of such testing in various parts of the world may have been of
particular concern., 241 They also speculated as to why Congress did not
require the existence of "an actual, meaningful relationship in every case,"
but did choose not to "excuse ... the formal requirements when an actual
father-child relationship is proved. 2 42 The majority concluded that Congress
"did neither here, perhaps because of the subjectivity, intrusiveness, and
difficulties of proof that might attend an inquiry into any particular bond or
tie. 243 However, there is a difference between hypothesizing about
Congress' actual purpose and speculating as to why Congress did not do
something it could have otherwise done. There is nothing in the precedents
that is inconsistent with the Court in gender cases engaging in the latter.
Justice O'Connor's point that the Court has "repeatedly rejected efforts
to justify sex-based classifications on the ground of administrative
convenience '244 was also not well taken. In the first place, the majority did
not attempt to justify the classification based on administrative convenience.
They simply pointed out that the scheme that Congress did adopt was one
that was "easily administered. 2 45 Of course, as the majority said, a statute
237. Id.
238. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975).
239. See infra notes 411-21,567-75 and accompanying text.
240. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 535-36; Hogan, 458 U.S. at 728; Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 212-13; see
also Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 469-70 (1981) (plurality opinion) (accepting the
asserted purpose, but pointing out that "the search for the 'actual' or 'primary' purpose of a statute is
likely to be elusive").
241. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 63 (2001).
242. Id. at 69.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 88 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142,
152 (1980); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973)).
245. Id. at 69.
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"should not be invalidated because Congress elected to advance an interest
that is less demanding to satisfy than some other alternative. 246
Even if the majority had tried to justify the classification on the basis of
administrative convenience, the precedents have not totally excluded it as a
justification for gender classifications. In Reed v. Reed, a unanimous Court
purporting to apply the rational basis test did hold that "[t]o give a
mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other,
merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, [was] to
make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal
Protection Clause. 247 However, in Frontiero v. Richardson, only Justice
Brennan's plurality opinion, purporting to apply strict scrutiny, explicitly
rejected administrative convenience as a justification for the classification at
issue.248 Furthermore, in Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co., the
majority, purporting to apply intermediate scrutiny, held that the "bare
assertion" of administrative convenience "falls far short of justifying gender-
based discrimination., 249 However, the majority went on to state that "[i]t
may be that there are levels of administrative convenience that will justify
discriminations that are subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause .... ,250 In addition, a majority of the Court in Califano v.
Goldfarb seemed to think that administrative convenience could justify a
gender distinction, at least in affirmative action cases.2  Perhaps in
recognition of the fact that administrative convenience might be a legitimate
rationale under some circumstances, Justice O'Connor, in Nguyen, went on
to conclude that "[t]here [was] no reason to think that this [was] a case
where administrative convenience concerns [were] so powerful that they
would justify the sex-based discrimination ....252
Furthermore, Justice O'Connor's assertion to the effect that the
classification should have been struck down because of the existence of
gender-neutral alternatives also seems misplaced. The cases she cited for the
proposition that "the availability of sex-neutral alternatives to a sex-based
classification is often highly probative of the validity of the
classification," 253 and, "[i]n... prior cases[,] ... has been a powerful reason
246. Id.
247. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971).
248. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 690-91.
249. Wengler, 446 U.S. at 151.
250. Id. at 152.
251. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 219-20 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring); Id. at 224-
42 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The plurality, however, did reject administrative convenience as a
rationale. Id. at 211 n.9.
252. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 88 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 78 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Wengler, 446 U.S. at 151; Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S.
268, 281 (1979); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975).
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to reject a sex-based classification 254 are arguably distinguishable from
Nguyen. In those cases, the Court did point out that gender-neutral means
existed for the government to achieve its asserted interests. However, the
issue in both Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co. and Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld was the constitutionality of alleged gender discrimination with
respect to the distribution of government benefits.255 In effect, the basic
rationale of those cases was that the classifications at issue were not even
reasonable, rational, or legitimate because they were based on archaic
stereotypes as to the financial dependency of women.256 By contrast, as the
majority saw it, the classification in Nguyen was based on a real difference
between men and women, and, therefore, the use of "gender specific terms"
was "sensible., 257 The issue in Orr v. Orr was the constitutionality of a
statute which excluded wives from paying alimony as a way of
"help[ing] ... needy spouses" and "compensating women for past
discrimination during marriage. 258 The Court held that the gender
classification was unnecessary since "individualized hearings at which the
parties' relative financial circumstances are considered already occur., 259 By
contrast, the issue in Nguyen was the constitutionality of the existing
procedures. 260
In addition, Justice O'Connor's critique of the majority's definition of a
gender stereotype is also not supported by the precedents. The majority
defined a stereotype "as a frame of mind resulting from irrational or
uncritical analysis., 261 They went on to conclude that the classification was
not based on a stereotype because:
[t]here is nothing irrational or improper in the recognition that at the
moment of birth-a critical event in the statutory scheme and in the
whole tradition of citizenship law-the mother's knowledge of the
child and the fact of parenthood have been established in a way not
guaranteed in the case of the unwed father.262
254. Id. at 82 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
255. See infra notes 411,440-41 and accompanying text.
256. See infra notes 411-21, 440-69 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 156-63, 186-91, 215-16 and accompanying text; infra notes 735-45 and
accompanying text.
258. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 280 (1979).
259. Id. at 281.
260. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 56-62 (2001).
261. Id. at 68.
262. Id.
Justice O'Connor responded that "[t]his Court has long recognized...
that an impermissible stereotype may enjoy empirical support and thus be in
a sense 'rational.' ' 263 However, the cases she cited do not support her
assertion that a stereotype may be rational if it has some empirical support.
To the contrary, the precedents support the proposition that a stereotype may
be irrational even if it has such support. Thus, in J.E.B. v. Alabama, which
Justice O'Connor cited, Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, said that
"[e]ven if a measure of truth can be found in some of the gender
stereotypes... that fact alone cannot support discrimination on the basis of
gender., 26 4 He went on to say that "[w]e have made abundantly clear in past
cases that gender classifications that rest on impermissible stereotypes
violate the Equal Protection Clause, even when some statistical support can
be conjured up for the generalization., 265 In making these assertions, Justice
Blackmun relied on Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld.266 In that case, the Court
struck down a classification that was premised on the assumption "that male
workers' earnings are vital to the support of their families, while the
earnings of female wage earners do not significantly contribute to their
families' support." 267 The Court found the classification to be "entirely
irrational ' 26 even though the "notion that men are more likely than women
to be the primary supporters of their spouses and children [was] not entirely
without empirical support. 269 Indeed, Justice O'Connor herself cited
Wiesenfeld.27° Clearly then, under the precedents, a stereotype may be
irrational in the constitutional sense even if it has some empirical support.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Justice O'Connor's second overarching
criticism to the effect that the majority had not applied intermediate scrutiny
at all, but instead had applied rational basis review, 27 is essentially correct.
The apparent paradox between this assertion and the assertion that the
majority opinion is consistent with the precedents that have applied
intermediate scrutiny is resolved by the fact that, in reality, intermediate
scrutiny, as applied in the gender cases, is a form of rational basis review.
2 72
263. Id. at 89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
264. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 139 n.l 1(1994).
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643 (1975).
268. Id. at 651.
269. Id. at 645.
270. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 90 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor also
cited Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Id. However, as discussed below, this case too may be
viewed has having applied the rational basis test. See infra notes 660-75 and accompanying text.
271. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 74-78, 82, 97 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
272. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 452 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (arguing that "[t]he rational-basis test, properly understood, adequately explains ... the
Equal Protection [cases]"). For a commentary on Justice Stevens' views, see Note, Stevens' Equal
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IV. IN REALITY INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY IS RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW IN
INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY CLOTHING
A. Rational Basis Review Revisited
The key to understanding that the gender cases are explainable on
rational basis grounds is the fact that rational basis review "is still
scrutiny. 273 Although Justice O'Connor pointed out the theoretical
differences between intermediate scrutiny and rational basis review in the
course of her dissent in Nguyen,274 she failed to acknowledge this fact. It is
true that rational basis review is a deferential standard, 275 but it is not
"abdication ' 27 6 and it is not "toothless., 277 A classification must nonetheless
"find some footing in the realities of the subject addressed." '278 It is also true
that, as a general matter, the state's actual purpose is "irrelevant" under
rational basis review.279 However, this assumes that the classification can be
said to have some constitutionally permissible purpose. Even under rational
basis review, the Court "insist[s] on knowing the relation between the
classification adopted and the object to be attained. '280 Thus, under rational
basis review the "Court need not in equal protection cases accept at face
value assertions of legislative purposes, when an examination of the
legislative scheme and its history demonstrates that the asserted purpose
could not have been a goal of the legislation. 28' Consequently, the Court
Protection Jurisprudence, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1146 (1987). See also Hlavac, supra note 18, at 1374-
76 (arguing that rational basis is the "best standard" for gender cases and that "any special protection
the intermediate-scrutiny test provides actually can be provided by the rational-basis test"); cf John
Marquez Lundin, Making Equal Protection Analysis Make Sense, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1191, 1232
(1999) (proposing a "rational distinction test" "[i]n place of the current regime of equal protection
analysis").
273. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 31 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
274. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 74-79 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
275. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1995); Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 11.
276. Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 31 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
277. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976). But see Hlavac, supra note 18, at 1377 ("the
existence of numerous intermediate levels of scrutiny has removed teeth from the bite of the
rational-basis test").
278. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993).
279. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).
280. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
281. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n.16 (1975) (citing Jimenez v. Weinberger,
417 U.S. 628, 634 (1974); United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1973);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)); see also Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 (majority found it
impossible "to credit" the State's "rationale" for the classification at issue).
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must still engage in a reasoned analysis of the underlying facts and policies
to determine whether there are reasons, real or plausible, to support the
classification, and whether they are rationally related to some legitimate
government purpose. A classification will only be upheld if the
government's purpose is, in fact, legitimate and if such reasons for it can be
articulated.
For example, in FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., the question was
the constitutionality of the FCC's interpretation and application of the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984.282 Under the Act, facilities that
provided video programming to buildings that were separately owned and
managed, or that used a public right-of-way, were subject to a franchise
requirement. 283 However, facilities that served one or more buildings under
common ownership or management and that did not use any public right-of-
way were exempt from the requirement. 28 4 The FCC applied the distinction
to satellite master antenna television (SMATV) facilities and held that they
were subject to the franchise requirement unless they fell within the
exemption. 285 SMATV operators appealed to the court of appeals, which, by
a majority vote, held that there was no rational basis for the statutory
distinction.286
The Court unanimously reversed. Justice Thomas, writing for eight
members of the Court,287 applied rational basis review. He noted that under
this standard, legislative acts have "a strong presumption of validity," 288 the
constitutionality of legislation can be based on "rational speculation
unsupported by evidence or empirical data, 289 legislation should be upheld
if there is "any reasonably conceivable state of facts 290 to support it even if
such facts did not motivate the legislature, 29' and legislative line drawing
may be "virtually unreviewable. 292 Nonetheless, he did not decide the case
simply on the ground that rational basis review is deferential. Rather, Justice
Thomas proceeded to engage in a reasoned analysis of the underlying facts
to determine whether there were, in fact, any "'plausible reasons,, 2 93 to
support the distinction. He concluded that there were at least two
282. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. at 310-13.
283. ld. at 309-10.
284. Id. at 310.
285. ld. at 311.
286. Id. at 312.
287. Justice Stevens concurred in the result. Id. at 320. See infra notes 295-97.
288. Beach Communication's, Inc., 508 U.S. at 314.
289. Id. at 315.
290. Id. at 313.
291. Id. at 315.
292. Id. at 316.
293. Id. at 313 (quoting United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980)).
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"conceivable, 294  justifications for the classification: "regulatory
efficiency ' 295 and the "potential for.., monopoly power. '2 96 It was only
after he was able to articulate such reasons for the classification that he
upheld the constitutionality of the statute.297
On the other hand, a classification fails even rational basis review if
there are no reasons, real or plausible, that can be articulated to support it.
294. Id. at 318-19.
295. Id. Justice Thomas reasoned that Congress could rationally conclude that the regulation of
facilities that serve one or more buildings under common management without crossing a public
right-of-way would not be worth the cost because of their limited size. Id. at 318. The SMATV
operators argued that Congress did not intend the distinction to be based on size. Id. They pointed to
the fact that prior to the Act, the FCC exempted from regulation cable systems with fewer than fifty
subscribers, but Congress omitted this exemption from the Act. Id. In a concurring opinion, Justice
Stevens agreed with this argument. Id. at 322 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Thomas
responded, "[w]hether the posited reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated Congress
is 'constitutionally irrelevant' and, in any event, the FCC's explanation indicate[d] that both
common ownership and number of subscribers were considered indicia of 'very small' cable
systems." Id. at 318 (citation omitted) (quoting Fritz, 449 U.S. at 179). Justice Thomas also
concluded that the exemption could "plausibl[y]" be based on "subscriber influence." Id. He
reasoned that the management of commonly owned or managed buildings could negotiate on behalf
of their tenants and would have an incentive to protect their interests. Id. at 318-19. Therefore, there
was "less need" to regulate facilities that serve such buildings. Id. at 319.
296. Id. at 320. Justice Thomas reasoned that where buildings were commonly owned or
managed, the owner or manager could negotiate a competitive price for their tenants. Id. at 319.
However, the first operator to serve separately owned or managed buildings could have a cost
advantage which might result in "effective monopoly power." Id. at 319-20. After installing a
satellite dish and associated transmission equipment on one building, "[h]e could connect additional
buildings for the cost of a few feet of cable, whereas any competitor would have to recover the cost
of his own satellite headend facility." Id. This possibility, he concluded, "might theoretically justify
regulating the latter class of SMATV systems and not the former." Id. at 320. Justice Stevens was
not "persuaded" by this reasoning. Id. at 322 (Stevens, J., concurring). For one thing, he thought that
the monopoly theory "assume[d] a great deal about the nature of what [was] essentially a
hypothetical market." Id. at 322 n.2. He also thought the theory failed to take into account that
competition from traditional cable could act as a restraint "on an SMATV operator's capacity to
extract monopoly rents from landlords." Id.
297. Id. at 320. Although "not fully persuaded" by the Court's rationale, Justice Stevens concurred
in the judgment because he thought it was "reasonable to presume that Congress was motivated by
an interest in allowing property owners to exercise freedom in the use of their own property." Id. at
322-23 (Stevens, J., concurring). He also disagreed with the Court's standard of review. He
interpreted the Court's test to require upholding a classification "'if there is any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that [justify it],"' and if plausible reasons exist for the classification, the
Court's inquiry is at an end. Id. at 323 n.3 (quoting Id. at 313). For Justice Stevens, this statement of
the standard of review was too broad. Id. He maintained that "'the Constitution requires something
more than merely a "conceivable" or "plausible" explanation . I... d. (quoting Fritz, 449 U.S. at
180 (Stevens, J., concurring)). For him, a classification should only be upheld if it is "rationally
related to 'a legitimate purpose that [the Court] may reasonably presume to have motivated an
impartial legislature."' Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Fritz, 449 U.S. at
181 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
Thus, for example, in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County
Commission,298 the Court unanimously held unconstitutional, under the
Equal Protection Clause, a tax assessor's method of reassessing property.2"
The Constitution and laws of the state required property to be taxed at a
uniform rate based on its market value.300 The assessor, however, reassessed
property recently sold at its purchase price, while making only modest
changes to property not recently sold.30 1 As a consequence, over time, there
were large disparities in the assessed value of comparable properties. °2 For
example, over a five year period, the petitioners' property was assessed at
eight to twenty times that of comparable property.3"3
The assessor argued that the acquisition value assessment scheme was
"rationally related to its purpose of assessing properties at true current
value ... [because recent purchase price is] exceedingly accurate
information about the market value of a property. 30 4  However, this
argument was "nonsensical ' 30 5 since the practice of assessing recently sold
property based on acquisition value, while making only minor adjustments
to other property, was "inherent[ly] inconsisten[t]" with the asserted purpose
of assessing properties at true market value.30 6 The reason was that under
such a system, only recently sold properties were assessed at current market
value. Thus, there were no reasons, real or conceivable, that could be
articulated to support the classification.
307
298. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336 (1989).
299. Id. at 338-43. However, Justice Thomas, who was not a member of the Court at the time of
Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co., has expressed the view that the case was wrongly decided. See
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 21-28 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).
300. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co., 488 U.S. at 345.
301. Id.at338.
302. Id. at 341.
303. Id. The Court noted that this was not a case where the disparities existed for "a short period
of time," id. at 343, as part of a "transitional delay," id. at 344, in achieving equal assessments.
304. Id. at 343.
305. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15 n.6 (1992) (discussing Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co.).
306. Id.
307. Id. at 15-16. By contrast, in Nordlinger, the Court, by an eight to one majority, applying
rational basis review, id. at 11, upheld against an equal protection attack a California property tax
scheme that resulted in a disparity in taxation between comparable properties analogous to the
scheme struck down in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. Id. at 3-18. Under the California scheme, real
property was taxed at its full market value as of the 1975-76 tax year and was only reassessed
thereafter "'when purchased, newly constructed, or a change of ownership... occurred."' Id. at 5
(quoting CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 2(a)). The majority held that this acquisition value scheme was a
means that was reasonably and rationally related to the achievement of two legitimate ends. Id. at 12.
First, "to discourage rapid turnover in ownership" of property so as to achieve "local neighborhood
preservation, continuity, and stability"; and second, to protect the reliance interest of existing owners
from higher taxes. Id. The Court distinguished Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. on the ground that, in
that case, there was "the absence of any indication ... that the policies underlying an acquisition-
value taxation scheme could conceivably have been the purpose for the ... unequal assessment
scheme." Id. at 15. This was so since, in that case, the assessor had argued that her acquisition value
216
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Similarly, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., the issue
was the constitutionality of the denial of a special use permit for a group
home for the mentally retarded.30 8 Justice White, writing for the majority, 0 9
held that the denial of the permit was unconstitutional because "the record
[did] not reveal any rational basis for believing that the ... home would pose
any special threat to the city's legitimate interests. 310 In reaching this
conclusion, he examined the alleged justifications for the decision and
reasoned that none of them were reasonable or rational. He held that the
denial could not be justified based on "mere negative attitudes, or fear"
because they were not "permissible bases" for the decision. 31' The denial
could also not be justified because of the home's location, either because
students in a nearby junior high school "might harass" the residents, or
because the home was to be "located on 'a -five hundred year flood
plain.' ' 312 As to the former, mentally retarded students attended the school,
and "undifferentiated fears" was not a permissible basis for denying the
scheme was a rational means of achieving current value assessment. Id. As noted in the text, the
Court found this argument "nonsensical," because under such a system only recently sold properties
were assessed at current market value. Id. at 15 n.6. Thus, the Court concluded that "Allegheny
Pittsburgh was the rare case where the facts precluded any plausible inference that the reason for the
unequal assessment practice was to achieve the benefits of an acquisition-value tax scheme." Id. at
16.
308. City ofClebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985).
309. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, concurred in the result. Id. at
455-78 (Marshall, J., concurring). However, he argued, inter alia, that the majority applied a "'more
exacting standard' than ordinary rational-basis review." Id. at 456. Justice Stevens, joined by Chief
Justice Burger, joined the Court's opinion, but also filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 451-55
(Stevens, J., concurring). He argued, in effect, that all of the Court's equal protection cases could be
explained on rational basis grounds. See id.
310. Id. at 448. The fact that Justice White referred to the record seems to have indicated to some
that the majority had applied something more than traditional rational basis review. See supra note
309. It is true that under rational basis review the government "has no obligation to produce
evidence to sustain the rationally of a statutory classification," Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320
(1993), and that a classification may be upheld "whether or not... [it] has a foundation in the
record." Id. at 320-21. However, there is nothing in the theory of rational basis review that prevents
the Court from considering any reasons that the government chooses to offer to justify a
classification that do appear in the record. This is precisely what the majority did in Cleburne.
Furthermore, not only did the majority in Cleburne say that they were applying rational basis review,
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441-42, but also in a subsequent case involving the mentally infirm, the Court
unanimously agreed that the case had applied that standard. Heller, 509 U.S. at 321, 336-37. In any
event, the result in Clebure is perfectly consistent with rational basis review since the essence of the
holding was that there was no conceivable or plausible justification for the denial of the permit other
than irrational prejudice. See infra notes 311-22.
311. Id.
312. Id. at449.
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permit. 31 3 As to the latter, there was no reason to distinguish between the
home for the mentally retarded and other homes that were permitted without
a permit, such as "nursing homes, homes for convalescents or the aged, or
sanitariums or hospitals."'3 14 For the same reason, the denial could not be
based on concerns "about [the] legal responsibility" of the residents of the
home,315 "the size of the home and the number of people that would occupy
it,'' 316  "avoiding concentration of population and ... lessening
congestion, '3 17  or "worry about fire hazards, the serenity of the
neighborhood, and the avoidance of danger to other residents. '31 8 Justice
White found that these reasons "fail[ed] rationally to justify singling out a
home [for the mentally retarded] ... for the special use permit, yet imposing
no such restrictions on the many other uses freely permitted"31 9 such as
"fraternity and sorority houses, hospitals and the like. 32 ° Since he found it
impossible to articulate any conceivable or plausible reason for the denial,
other than "irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded, '32' he
concluded that the requirement of a special use permit was
unconstitutional.322
As Cleburne suggests, a classification also fails rational basis review if
the purpose the government seeks to achieve is illegitimate. A classification
is illegitimate if its purpose is otherwise unconstitutional, such as penalizing
the right to travel.323 The Court has also held as illegitimate classifications
those that seek to distinguish between state residents based on their past
contributions.324 A classification is also impermissible if its purpose is "to
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 450.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 448. For other cases where the classification at issue was held to fail rational basis
review, see cases cited supra note 281. See also Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
323. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (determining that a one year waiting period for
new residents to receive full welfare benefits penalized the right to travel under equal protection); cf
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (striking down a similar provision as in Shapiro, but without
discussing equal protection).
324. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 63; Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 632; cf Saenz, 526 U.S. at 507 (rejecting "any
contributory rationale for the denial of benefits to new residents" without discussing equal
protection). However, on the current Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and
Stevens appear to believe that such a purpose is not necessarily illegitimate, at least as long as it does
not infringe on the right to travel. In Zobel, both Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion, Zabel,
457 U.S. at 71-81 (O'Connor, J., concurring), and Justice Rehnquist in his dissenting opinion, id. at
81-84 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), expressed the view that classifications that distinguish between
state residents based on their past contributions are not necessarily unconstitutional and that the
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harm a politically unpopular group ''325  or is otherwise based on
"anim[osity], ' 326 "negative attitudes, '327 or " irrational prejudice '32 8 toward a
particular class of persons. The Court may have also held that classifications
that seek to provide affirmative action for women are constitutionally
impermissible if they are unnecessary or merely gratuitous.
32 9
Despite protestations to the contrary, 30 a detailed analysis of the cases
reveals that the type of rational basis analysis illustrated by cases such as
Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co., Beach Communications, Inc., and Cleburne
Living Center, Inc. is at work, at least in effect, in the gender cases. The
underlying questions have been whether the classification at issue is based
on a legitimate difference between the genders resulting from the fact that
they are not similarly situated, or whether it is based on stereotypical
"outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of men and women"331 in
situations where they are similarly situated; and, even if the former, whether
the fit between the means and the otherwise permissible ends are reasonable
and rational enough to justify the distinction. However, the answers to these
questions require reasoned analysis upon which reasonable Justices can
differ.332 Thus, in the end, the results in these cases inevitably turn on how
Court had only held so in the context of cases which infringed the right to travel. Subsequently, in
Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, Justice O'Connor, in her dissenting opinion in which
Justices Rehnquist and Stevens joined, stated that she "continue[d] to believe that a State's desire to
compensate its citizens for their prior contributions is 'neither inherently invidious nor irrational,'
either under the Court's 'right to migrate' or under some undefined, substantive component of the
Equal Protection Clause." Attorney Gen. for N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 920 (1986)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Recently, in Saenz, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority that included
Justice O'Connor, "reject[ed] any contributory rationale" to justify a California scheme that denied
full welfare benefits to certain new residents for one year. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 507. However, Saenz is
not inconsistent with the views expressed by Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, and Stevens in Zobel
and Soto-Lopez since the majority concluded that the California scheme penalized the right to travel.
Id. at 500-07.
325. United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
326. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
327. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985).
328. Id. at 450.
329. See infra notes 576-81, 593-95 and accompanying text.
330. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 74-77 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Miller v. Albright,
523 U.S. 420, 452 (1998) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that "[i]t is unlikely, in [her] opinion,
that any gender classifications based on stereotypes can survive heightened scrutiny, but under
rational scrutiny, a statute may be defended based on generalized classifications unsupported by
empirical evidence."); ef United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555 (1996) ("[D]eferential
review ... [is] a brand of review inconsistent with the more exacting standard our precedent
requires.").
331. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441.
332. For non-gender cases where the Court was divided on whether a classification survived
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the Court and the individual Justices view the underlying facts and policies
rather than any particular verbalization of the standard of review.
333
B. Pre-1971 Gender Cases
Until 1971, a majority of the Court's general attitude towards gender
was based on a nineteenth century perception of the legitimate differences
between men and women, both physically and with respect to their roles in
society. Women's proper place was at the center of family life, not the
market or politics; and, it was constitutional for states to try to protect them
from the vicissitudes of life when they ventured outside the home.334
rational basis review, see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1995) (state constitutional amendment
effecting rights of homosexuals); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993) (distinction between mental
retardation and mental illness for purpose of civil commitment); Kadrmas v. Dickerson Pub. Sch.,
487 U.S. 450 (1988) (distinction between reorganized and nonreorganized schools with respect to
charging a fee for busing); Lyng v. Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace, & Agric. Implement
Workers, 485 U.S. 360 (1988) (denial of food stamps to striking workers); Lyng v. Castillo, 477
U.S. 635 (1986) (distinction for purposes of food stamp distribution between parents, children, and
siblings who lived together, and other groups of related or unrelated persons who lived together);
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 917 (1980) (denial of Medicaid reimbursement for medically
necessary abortions while paying for it for normal pregnancy); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628
(1974) (denial of certain benefits to illegitimate children); United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528 (1973) (regarding a distinction for food stamp purposes between households of related
individuals and those where at least one person is not related to the others); San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (school funding through property tax); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970) (distribution of welfare benefits).
333. But cf Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). In her majority opinion,
Justice O'Connor opined that "when a classification expressly discriminates on the basis of gender,
the analysis and level of scrutiny ... do not vary simply because the objective appears acceptable to
individual Members of the Court." Id. at 724 n.9.
334. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62-63 (1961) (upholding under Equal Protection Clause a
state law that exempted women from jury duty on the ground that a "woman is still regarded as the
center of home and family life" and the legislature could conclude that "it would not be
administratively feasible to decide in each individual instance whether the family responsibilities of
a prospective female juror was serious enough to warrant an exemption"); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335
U.S. 464, 464, 466 (1948) (upholding under Equal Protection Clause a state law that refused to
license women as bartenders, unless they were the daughter or wife of a male owner, on the ground
that "the Constitution does not require situations 'which are different in fact or opinion to be treated
in law as though they were the same"' and "bartending by women may, in the allowable legislative
judgment, give rise to moral and social problems against which it may devise preventive measures")
(quoting Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940)); Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59, 63 (1912)
(upholding under the Equal Protection Clause a state law that imposed a license tax on hand
laundries, but exempted those where not more than two women were employed on the ground that
when a state "deems it advisable to put a lighter burden upon women than upon men with regard to
an employment that our people commonly regard as more appropriate for the former, the Fourteenth
Amendment does not interfere by creating a fictitious equality where there is a real difference");
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908) (upholding under the Due Process Clause a state law
that limited the number of hours women could be employed in certain establishments on the grounds
that there are real physical differences between the genders and it was "essential to vigorous
offspring" to have "healthy mothers"); Ex parte Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894) (upholding under
the Privileges and Immunities Clause a state law that prohibited women from practicing law);
220
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Consequently, the Court, applying rational basis review, had little difficulty
in upholding gender classifications that today are viewed as "archaic
stereotypes '335 of women and their abilities. The attitude of at least some
members of the Court during this era may be summarized by Justice
Bradley's infamous dictum that:
[t]he natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the
female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil
life.... The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill
the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of
the Creator.336
C. Post-1971 Gender Cases
Beginning in 1971 with Reed v. Reed,337 the Court's attitude towards
gender classifications began to change. What changed was the Court's view
of what are legitimate differences between men and women and what are
outmoded stereotypes. Perhaps mirroring the changes in society, the Court
no longer viewed the role of women as simply that of wife and mother unfit
for "the marketplace and the world of ideas., 338 As the Court's attitude
towards gender changed so did the result in the cases. Significantly, this
change was initially accomplished without changing the articulated standard
of review. Gender classifications still only had to be reasonably or rationally
related to a legitimate government objective. Although the verbalization of
the standard of review eventually changed, the underlying analysis, in effect,
has not. Where a majority of the Court views the classification as being
reasonable, rational, and legitimate, they have upheld it; and where they
view the classification to be irrational, unreasonable, or illegitimate, they
have struck it down. Consequently, the new verbalization of the standard of
review, as substantially related to important governmental objectives, has
had little effect on the outcome of the cases.
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872) (same); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874) (upholding
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause a state law that prohibited women from voting).
335. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725.
336. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
337. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); see infra notes 349-52 and accompanying text.
338. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975).
1. Overbroad Generalizations
In a series of cases, the Court has struck down classifications as being
based on stereotypical overbroad generalizations that a woman's place is in
the home, women are less capable than men, and women are financially
dependent on men. In some cases, the Court also found that the means were
not even reasonably or rationally related to their ends. No form of
heightened scrutiny is necessary to explain the results in these cases.339 Even
under rational basis review, a classification must have some constitutionally
permissible purpose, and there must be some articulated reasonable or
rational basis to support it. Thus, the results in these cases are to the effect
that the classifications at issue were not reasonable, rational, or legitimate.
Indeed, the initial decisions applied rational basis review.
a. A Woman's Place Is in the Home
Thus, in Stanton v. Stanton, the Court held as violative of equal
protection a statute that required parents to support their sons until age
twenty-one, but their daughters only until age eighteen. 340 A divorced father
who stopped making support payments to his eighteen year-old daughter
argued that the gender distinction was justified based on the different roles
of men and women in society. 34' The argument was that "it is the man's
primary responsibility to provide a home and that it is salutary for him to
have education and training before he assumes that responsibility; that girls
tend to mature earlier than boys; and that females tend to marry earlier than
males. ' '342 The Court, eight to one,343 rejected the argument that these "'old
notions' ' 344 provided a "rational '3 45 basis for the distinction.3 46 It noted that
"[n]o longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the
family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas. 347
Consequently, the Court concluded that the statute was unconstitutional
regardless of whether the standard of review was verbalized as "compelling
state interest, or rational basis, or something in between. 348
339. See Hlavac, supra note 18, at 1376 ("Any classification scheme that is founded on overbroad
and stereotypic notions would fail under the rational-basis test because they cannot be 'reasonably
related' to their purported objectives.").
340. Stanton, 421 U.S. at 9, 17.
341. See id. at 14-15.
342. Id. at 14.
343. Justice Rehnquist was the lone dissenter. See id. at 18-20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
344. Id. at 14.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 14-15.
348. Id. at 17.
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b. Women are Less Capable Than Men
Similarly, the Court has struck down statutes that prefer men to women
on the apparent assumption that, as a class, men are more capable than
women. In the initial case, Reed v. Reed, the Court, applying the rational
basis test, 349 unanimously held that a statute which preferred males over
females as administrators of intestate estates, where there were competing
applications, violated equal protection.350 The Court concluded that such a
distinction, "merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits,
[was] to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. '35 As characterized
in a later case, the problem with the statute in Reed was that it was based on
an "archaic and overbroad [generalization] . .. that men would generally be
better estate administrators than women.,
352
As the law evolved into intermediate scrutiny, the Court, in Kirchberg v.
Feenstra, unanimously held that a state statute "that gave a husband, as
'head and master' of property jointly owned with his wife, the unilateral'
right to dispose of such property without his spouse's consent"353 violated
equal protection. Justice Marshall explicitly applied intermediate scrutiny. 4
He phrased the issue in terms of whether the statute "substantially
further[ed] an important government interest., 355 He said that the Court
would not "speculate about the existence of such a justification," 35 6 and that
the "burden remains on the party seeking to uphold a statute that expressly
discriminates on the basis of sex to advance an 'exceedingly persuasive
justification' for the challenged classification. 35 7 He held that the statute,
349. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Writing for the majority, Justice Burger noted that, under
the Equal Protection Clause, "[a] classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation,
so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."' Id. at 76 (quoting F.S. Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). The "substantial relation" language in this quote
seems to have been the origin of intermediate scrutiny applied in later cases. However, as Justice
Burger stated it, the issue in the case was "whether a difference in the sex of competing applicants
for letters of administration bears a rational relationship to a state objective that is sought to be
advanced." Id.
350. Id. at 76-77.
351. Id. at 76.
352. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 507 (1975).
353. Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 456 (1981).
354. Id. at 461.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 460 n.7.
357. Id. at 461 (quoting Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)).
"[b]y granting the husband exclusive control over the disposition of
community property,... clearly embodie[d] the type of express gender-
based discrimination that we have found unconstitutional absent a showing
that the classification is tailored to further an important governmental
interest."3 'R Although Justice Marshall analyzed the case in terms of
intermediate scrutiny, that verbalization of the standard of review was not
necessary to achieve the result. Factually the case was analogous to Reed.
On its face, the statute was based on an arbitrary and overbroad
generalization that "[t]he husband is the head and master" of community
property.359 Consequently, under Reed, the statute could not even survive the
rational basis test.36 ° Indeed, it is hard to imagine any articulative rational
basis that could justify the distinction.36'
A more controversial decision was JE.B. v. Alabama,36 2 in which the
issue was the constitutionality of the State's use of gender based peremptory
challenges. The State argued that peremptory challenges based on gender
were constitutional because in certain cases, such as those involving
paternity, there is a real difference between men and women "otherwise
totally qualified to serve upon a jury" with respect to their "sympath[ies]"
and "receptive[ness] to the arguments" made by the parties.363 Men "'might
be more sympathetic and receptive to the arguments of a man alleged in a
paternity action to be the father of an out-of-wedlock child, while
women.., might be more sympathetic and receptive to the arguments of the
complaining witness who bore the child.
'
,
3 64
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, rejected this argument. He
analyzed the case in terms of the rhetoric of intermediate scrutiny.3 65 He said
that gender classifications "must be more than merely rational. '366 Instead,
358. Id. at 459-60. Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehnquist, concurred in the result. Id. at 463
(Stewart, J., concurring). Although he did not articulate any particular standard of review, he agreed
that the statute "which allowed husbands but not wives to execute mortgages on jointly owned real
estate without spousal consent ... violated the Equal Protection Clause" "[s]ince men and women
were similarly situated for all relevant purposes with respect to the management and disposition of
community property." Id.
359. Id.at457n.l.
360. See Hlavac, supra note 18, at 1376 ("[1]ntermediate scrutiny is not essential to protect against
discriminatory classifications based on gender. This protection can be afforded by the rational-basis
test as the [C]ourt applied it in Reed.").
361. Cf Kirchberg, 450 U.S. at 460 n.7 (arguing that, under the circumstances, the complaining
party "would be hard pressed to show that the challenged provision substantially furthered an
important governmental interest").
362. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
363. Id. at 137-38.
364. Id. (quoting Brief for Respondents at 10, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127
(1994)).
365. See id. at 136.
366. Id. at 141 n.12.
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"gender-based classifications require 'an exceedingly persuasive
justification' in order to survive constitutional scrutiny. '367 Thus, "the only
question [was] whether discrimination on the basis of gender in jury
selection substantially further[ed] the State's legitimate interest in achieving
a fair and impartial trial., 368 He found that the State's argument was "far
from ... an exceptionally persuasive justification., 369 However, intermediate
scrutiny had little to do with the outcome in the case. Justice Blackmun's
ultimate conclusion was that the distinction was based on an overbroad
generalization that "serve[d] only to perpetuate ... 'outmoded notions of the
relative capabilities of men and women. ' ,'370 On this view of the underlying
367. Id. at 136 (quoting Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)).
368. Id.
369. Id. at 137.
370. Id. at 139 n.11 (quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985)).
Justice Blackmun said that "[w]e shall not accept as a defense... 'the very stereotype the law
condemns."' Id. 138 (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991)). He found the State's
argument to be similar to those that had been used to exclude women entirely from juries, and the
State offered "virtually no support for the conclusion that gender alone is an accurate predictor of
juror's attitudes." Id. at 138-39. He noted that while the State cited one study indicating that in
",rape cases ... female jurors appear to be somewhat more conviction-prone than male jurors,'...
[t]he majority of studies suggest that gender plays no identifiable role in jurors attitudes." Id. at 138
n.9 (quoting R. HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 140 (1983)). In any event, he asserted that "[e]ven if
a measure of truth can be found in some of the gender stereotypes used to justify gender-based
peremptory challenges, that fact alone cannot support discrimination on the basis of gender ... even
when some statistical support can be conjured up for the generalization." Id. at 139 n.l 1. In his view,
"[tihe Equal Protection Clause... acknowledges that a shred of truth may be contained in some
stereotypes, but requires that state actors look beyond the surface before making judgments about
people that are likely to stigmatize as well as to perpetuate historical patterns of discrimination." Id.
Justice Blackmun also thought that "[d]iscrimination in jury selection, whether based on race or on
gender, causes harm to the litigants, the community, and the individual jurors who are wrongfully
excluded from participation in the judicial process." Id. at 140. In his view "[tihe litigants are
harmed by the risk that the prejudice that motivated the discriminatory selection of the jury will
infect the entire proceedings," and "[t]he community is harmed by the State's participation in the
perpetuation of invidious group stereotypes and the inevitable loss of confidence in our judicial
system." Id. He thought that individual jurors are harmed because "[all persons, when granted the
opportunity to serve on a jury, have the right not to be excluded summarily because of
discriminatory and stereotypical presumptions that reflect and reinforce patterns of historical
discrimination." Id. at 141-42. Eliminating jurors "on the assumption that they hold particular views
simply because of their gender is 'practically a brand upon them ... an assertion of their
inferiority[,]' [and] [i]t denigrates the dignity of the excluded juror, and, for a woman, reinvokes a
history of exclusion from political participation." Id. at 142 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303, 308 (1880)). It conveys a "message... to all those in the courtroom, and all those who
may later learn of the discriminatory act,... that certain individuals, for no reason other than gender,
are presumed unqualified by state actors to decide important questions upon which reasonable
persons could disagree." Id. In addition, the State's use of gender based peremptory challenges
would "ratify and reinforce prejudicial views of the relative abilities of men and women" and
"'invite cynicism respecting the jury's neutrality"' especially in cases "where gender-related issues
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facts and policies, the classification was not reasonable, rational, or
legitimate. Consequently, it could not even pass the rational basis test as
applied in Reed"' and Stanton.
United States v. Virginia is yet another case in which the Court struck
down a classification that was apparently based on the stereotypical
are prominent, such as ... rape, sexual harassment, or paternity." Id. at 140 (quoting Powers, 499
U.S. at 412). Also, they "may create the impression that the judicial system has acquiesced in
suppressing full participation by one gender or that the 'deck has been stacked' in favor of one side."
Id.
Interestingly, Justice O'Connor, who joined the majority opinion, also wrote a separate concurring
opinion in which she disagreed with Justice Blackmun's assumption that gender-based peremptory
challenges are based on stereotypes rather than real differences between the attitudes of men and
women. She said that "one need not be a sexist to share the intuition that in certain cases" "for
example ... rape ... sexual harassment, child custody, or spousal or child abuse,... a person's
gender and resulting life experience will be relevant to his or her view of the case." Id. at 149
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Furthermore, she was concerned that the Court's decision "erode[d] the
role of the peremptory challenge," id. at 147 (O'Connor, J., concurring), "[increasing] the possibility
that biased jurors [would] be allowed onto the jury," id. at 148 (O'Connor, J., concurring), and
"severely limit[ed] a litigant's ability to act on ... intuition." Id. at 149 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Nonetheless, she agreed "that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the government from excluding
a person from jury service on account of that person's gender," id. at 146 (O'Connor, J., concurring),
and that the State had failed to show an "exceedingly persuasive" justification for the exclusion. Id.
Her rationale, however, had nothing to do with intermediate scrutiny as the verbalization of the
standard. Instead, it was based on her view of the underlying policies. She thought that, like race, it
was simply "'a special rule of relevance, a statement about what this Nation stands for, rather than a
statement of fact' that is designed "to eliminate the potential discriminatory use of the peremptory."
Id. at 149 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Brown v. North Carolina, 479 U.S. 940, 941-42
(1986)). However, because of her "concerns" over the erosion of the peremptory challenges, she
expressed the "hope" that the case would be "limited" to their use by the Government and would not
apply to "private civil litigants and criminal defendants." Id. at 150-51 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In
other words, in effect, Justice O'Connor also applied the rational basis test. She thought that the use
of gender peremptory challenges were reasonable and legitimate in some circumstances but not in
others.
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, dissenting, did not clearly
apply any particular standard of review. However, he did say that "[t]he parties [did] not contest that
discrimination on the basis of sex is subject to what our cases call 'heightened scrutiny."' Id. at 157
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Nonetheless he, too, in effect, thought that the use of gender peremptory
challenges was reasonable and legitimate. He agreed with Justice O'Connor that jurors were not
"fungible." Id. at 157-58 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Indeed, he noted that the majority's position to the
contrary put "the Court in opposition to its earlier Sixth Amendment 'fair cross-section' cases"
which "'have concluded that women bring to juries their own perspectives and values that influence
both jury deliberation and result."' Id. (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 532 (1975)). He
also thought that the result in the case did "much damage ... to the peremptory challenge system...
[a]nd... to the entire justice system." Id. at 161-62 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He criticized the majority
for "focusing unrealistically upon individual exercises of the peremptory challenge, and ignoring the
totality of the practice." Id. at 159 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In addition, he argued that "[s]ince all
groups are subject to the peremptory challenge (and will be made the object of it, depending upon
the nature of the particular case) it is hard to see how any group is denied equal protection." Id. His
main point was that historically "[w]omen were categorically excluded from juries because of doubt
that they were competent; women are stricken from juries by peremptory challenge because of doubt
that they are well disposed to the striking party's case." Id. at 160 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In his view,
"[t]here is discrimination and dishonor in the former, and not in the latter." Id.
371. See source cited supra note 360.
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assumption that women are less capable than men. In that case the State
attempted to justify the exclusion of women from the Virginia Military
Institute (VMI), and the creation of a separate program for them, inter alia
on the ground that the VMI's adversative method of instruction was
372 Steinappropriate for women. The State argued that there are "'real"'
"'important differences between men and women in learning and
development needs.' ' 373 These include the fact that "'males tend to need an
atmosphere of adversativeness' while 'females tend to thrive in a
cooperative atmosphere.' ' 374 Consequently, the State argued, that "VMI's
adversative method of training... [could not] be made available,
unmodified to women" since "[a]lterations to accommodate women would
necessarily be 'radical,' [and] so 'drastic,' ... as to transform, indeed
'destroy,' VMI's program." 375 The Court seven to one rejected this argument
and held the exclusion of women unconstitutional. 76
Justice Ginsburg, writing for six members of the Court, purported to
analyze the case in terms of intermediate scrutiny.377 However, she paid only
lip service to the requirement that the means be substantially related to
important governmental objectives.378 Nonetheless, she did assert that since
Reed, courts are required "to take a 'hard look' at generalizations or
'tendencies' of the kind pressed by Virginia," 379 and concluded that the State
had failed to establish an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the
classification.3"0 She characterized the case as involving the "categorical
exclusion" of women "in total disregard of their individual merit.",381 She
held that "[s]ate actors controlling gates to opportunity... may not exclude
qualified individuals based on 'fixed notions concerning the roles and
372. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 540-46 (1996). The State also argued that the
classification could be justified as a type of affirmative action for women. For a discussion of this
aspect of the case, see infra text accompanying notes 643-59.
373. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 549 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 28, United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. 515 (1996)).
374. Id. at 541 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1434 (W. D. Va. 1991),
vacated 976 F.2d. 890 (4"' Cir. 1992), aff'd518 U.S. 515 (1996)).
375. Id. at 540 (quoting Brief for Cross-Petitioners at 34-36, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515 (1996)).
376. Justice Thomas did not participate in the case. Id. at 558.
377. Id. at 533.
378. See id. at 533, 532-57.
379. Id. at 541 (quoting Sandra Day O'Connor, Portia's Progress, Lecture at the James Madison
Lecture on Constitutional Law at New York University School of Law (Oct. 29, 1991) in 66 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 1546, 1551 (1991)).
380. Id. at 546 (quoting Miss, Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731 (1982).
381. Id.
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abilities of males and females,' ' 382 and that "generalizations about 'the way
women are,' [and] estimates of what is appropriate for most women, no
longer justify denying opportunity to women whose talent and capacity
place them outside the average description.
383
Despite the broad dictum concerning intermediate scrutiny, the result in
the case is explainable on rational basis grounds. In the first place, there was
seemly no relationship, rational or otherwise, between the admission of
women and the asserted objective of maintaining the adversative system.
This is so since the case was brought on behalf of women who wanted to be
subjected to that method of instruction.384 Thus it was irrelevant, even if
true, that the adversative method was not suited to most women.
Furthermore, it was "never asserted that VMI's method of instruction
method of education suit[ed] most men, " 385 and, in fact, "it is probable that
'many men would not want to be educated in such an environment.' 386
Consequently, gender was irrelevant to the classification's asserted purpose.
In addition, as Justice Ginsburg pointed out, the type of argument made
by the State was the same type of argument used historically to exclude
382. Id. at 541 (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725).
383. Id at 550. Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred in the result. He agreed with the majority that
VMI's exclusion of women could not be justified on ground that the adversative method of
instruction was inappropriate for women. Id. at 564 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). However, his
reasoning was different. In his view, "[a] State does not have a substantial interest in the adversative
method unless it is pedagogically beneficial,... and.., there ... [was] no ... evidence in the
record that an adversative method is pedagogically beneficial or is any more likely to produce
character traits than any other methodologies."Id. He also criticized the majority's emphasis on
requiring the State to establish an exceedingly persuasive justification. Id. at 559 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring). See supra notes 123-126 and accompanying text.
Justice Scalia was the lone dissenter. He began his dissent by criticizing the Court's tri-level equal
protection jurisprudence in general. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 567-70 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
However, he thought that the exclusion of women was constitutional even under intermediate
scrutiny "honestly" applied. Id. at 570 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For him the majority's "most
fundamental error... [was] its reasoning that VMI's all male composition [was] unconstitutional
because 'some women are capable of all of the individual activities required of VMI cadets,' . . . and
would prefer military training on the adversative model." Id. at 579 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, (W.D. Va. 1991) vacated 976 F.2d 890 (4"' Cir. 1992)
aff"d. 518 U.S. 515 (1996). He argued that "[i]ntermediate scrutiny has never required a least-
restrictive-means analysis," id. at 573 (Scalia, J., dissenting), and "[t]here is simply no support in
our cases for the notion that a sex-based classification is invalid unless it relates to characteristics
that hold true in every instance." Id. at 574 (Scalia, J., dissenting).. He was convinced that the VMI's
"single sex education" based on the adversative method was substantially related to the "important
state interest in providing effective college education for its citizens." Id. at 576 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). See id. 576-79 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Consequently, for him, it was "irrelevant" "that
VMI would not have to change very much if it were to admit women," id. at 587-88, (Scalia, J.,
dissenting), and that "there are some women interested in attending VMI, capable of undertaking its
activities, and able to meet its physical demands." Id. at 572 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
384. See id. at 542, 550.
385. Id. at 550
386. Id. at 542 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 52 F.3d 90, 93 (Motz, J., dissenting), rev'd,
518 U.S. 515 (1996)).
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women from the legal and medical professions.3 87 Furthermore, as Justice
Ginsburg argued, while the admission of women to VMI "would require
accommodations, primarily in arranging housing assignments and physical
training," 388 "VMI's mission. . . to produce 'citizen- soldiers' . . . [was]
great enough to include women,, 389 and that women have successfully
entered U.S. military academies.39° Perhaps more importantly the lower
courts had found that:
VMI's 'implementing methodology' is not 'inherently unsuitable
for women,' 3 9' ... 'some women ... do well under [the]
adversative model,' 392... 'some women, at least, would want to
attend [VMI] if they had the opportunity,' 393 ... 'some women are
capable of all the individual activities required of VMI
cadets,'394 . . . and 'can meet the physical standards [VMI] now
impose[s] on men."'3 95
Under these circumstances, the argument that women, who otherwise
met VMI's requirements, had to be excluded in order to maintain the
adversative system was arbitrary.396  Consequently, it could not have
survived the rational basis test as applied in Reed.3 97
387. Id. at 542-44.
388. Id. at 540.
389. Id. at 545.
390. id at 544-45.
391. Id. at 550 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 899 (4th Cir. 1992), aff'd, 518
U.S. 515 (1996)).
392. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp 1407, 1434 (W. D.
Va. 1991), vacated, 976 F.2d 890 (4" Cir. 1992), aff'd, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)).
393. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1414).
394. Id. (quoting Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1412).
395. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Virginia, 976 F.2d at 896).
396. But see supra note 383. The conclusion that the result in Virginia is explainable on rational
basis grounds is not inconsistent with the mandatory retirement cases. In those cases, the Court,
applying rational basis review, upheld mandatary retirement laws, as applied to judges, foreign
service officers, and uniform police officers, even though they allegedly discriminated against
individuals based on generalizations concerning the capabilities of the aged as a class. See Gregory
v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 ,455,470-73 (1991) (age seventy for most state judge), Vance v. Bradley,
440 U.S. 93, 95-112 (1979) (age sixty for participants in the Foreign Service retirement system),
Massachusetts Board of Retirement Board v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 308-17 (1976) (age fifty for
uniformed state police officers). The result in those cases turned on the fact that the jobs at issue
involved important public functions that required considerable physical or mental prowess, see
Gregory, 501 U.S. at 472, Vance, 440 U.S. at 103-06, Murgia, 427 U.S. at 310-1I, and "that aging -
almost by definition - inevitably wears us all down." Bradley, 440 U.S. at 112. See also Gregory 501
U.S. at 472, Murgia 427 U.S. at 315. Consequently, the mandatory age requirements were rationally,
if not perfectly, related to the object of the laws which was to ensure that the persons who hold those
229
c. Women are Financially Dependent on Men
The Court has also struck down classifications that treat the genders
differently with respect to the distribution of government benefits based on
the assumption that women, but not men, are economically dependent on
their spouses. Again, the initial cases applied the rational basis test. Thus, in
Frontiero v. Richardson, the Court held unconstitutional a federal statute
that provided that a serviceman could claim his wife as a dependent, for
purposes of increased quarters allowance, whether or not she was in fact
dependent on him for support, whereas a servicewoman could not claim her
husband as a dependent for such allowance unless he was in fact dependent
on her for more than half of his support.39" The Court divided on the issue of
the standard of review. At this point in the evolution of the doctrine, Justice
Brennan, writing for a four Justice plurality, insisted that gender
classifications were inherently suspect and should be subject to strict
scrutiny.3 99 However, five members of the Court refused to apply strict
scrutiny and instead applied rational basis review.400 Nonetheless, the Court,
vital positions have the physical and mental capacity to carry out their functions. See, Gregory 501
U.S. at 470-73, Vance, 440 U.S. at 108-12, Murgia 427 U.S. at 315-17. By contrast the gender
classification in Virginia did not involve any important governmental function. More importantly,
unlike diminished capacity caused by age, it was not inevitable that the adversative method was
unsuitable for women or that the it would have to change if women were admitted. Indeed, as noted
in the text, see supra note 391 and accompanying text, the lower Courts had found that "VMI's
'implementing methodology' was not 'inherently unsuitable for women."' Virginia, 518 U.S. at 550
(quoting United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 899 (4"' Cir. 1992), aff'd, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)).
Thus, the exclusion of women was arbitrary in that it was not reasonably or rationally related to the
purpose of maintaining VMI's adversative method of instruction.
Similarly, New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979), is also not inconsistent
with the conclusion that the classification in Virginia was irrational. In that case a majority of the
Court upheld, against an equal protection attack, a Transit Authority (TA) rule that prohibited the
employment of methadone users. Id. at 570, 587-94. The District Court held that "employment in
nonsensitive jobs could not be denied to methadone users who had progressed satisfactory with their
treatment for one year, and who, when examined individually, satisfied TA's employment criteria."
Id. at 589. The Court reversed. The majority found that there were "uncertainties associated with the
rehabilitation of heroin addicts," and that "the 'no drugs' policy ... enforced by TA is supported by
the legitimate inference that as long as a treatment program (or other drug use) continues, a degree of
uncertainty persists." Id at 591. Consequently "an employment policy that postpones eligibility until
the treatment program has been completed, rather than accepting an intermediate point on an
uncertain line, [was] rational." Id. at 591-92. The exclusion of methadone users, at least until their
treatment was completed, certainly was reasonably and rationally related to the obvious public
interest in having a drug free work place especially with respect to a public transit system. By
contrast, as noted in the text, the permanent exclusion of women from VMI was not reasonably or
rationally related to its asserted purpose. See supra notes 384-96 and accompanying text.
397. Cf supra note 360. Although Justice Ginsburg characterized Reed as requiring "'hard look'
review, see supra note 379 and accompanying text, the actual holding in the case was that the
classification at issue was arbitrary. See supra notes 351-52 and accompanying text.
398. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 678 (1973).
399. Id. at 682.
400. Four members of the Court concluded that the statute was unconstitutional based on Reed. Id.
at 691 (Stewart, J., concurring); Id. at 691-92 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J. and Blackmun J.,
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eight to one,40' had little difficulty in holding that the statute denied
servicewomen equal protection. As characterized in a later case, the
principal problem with the statute was that it was based on an "archaic and
overbroad generalization ' 40 2 "that female spouses of servicemen would
normally be dependent upon their husbands, while male spouses of
servicewomen would not.
40 3
Although Justice Brennan purported to apply strict scrutiny, he also
found, at least in effect, the classification was not even reasonably or
rationally related to its purported ends.40" The government "concede[d]" that
the classification "serve[d] no purpose other than mere 'administrative
convenience.'' 405 Its argument was that since:
as an empirical matter, wives in our society frequently are
dependent upon their husbands, while husbands rarely are
dependent upon their wives ... [it is] both cheaper and easier
simply conclusively to presume that wives of male members are
financially dependent upon their husbands, while burdening female
members with the task of establishing dependency in fact.40 6
Consistent with rational basis review, Justice Brennan engaged in a
reasoned analysis of the underlying facts to determine if the only articulated
reason was reasonable and rational. He cited statistics for the proposition
that there was "substantial evidence that, if put to the test, many of the wives
of male members would fail to qualify for benefits."0 7 He also noted "that
the dependency determination ... is presently made solely on the basis of
concurring). Justice Rehnquist dissented for the reasons stated by the majority in the district court.
Id. at 691 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The district court held that overall the statute did not create a
gender classification and that there was a rational basis for the distinction between men and women.
Frontiero v. Laird, 341 F. Supp. 201, 209 (1972), rev'd, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973).
401. Justice Rehnquist was the lone dissenter. See sources cited supra note 400.
402. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975).
403. Id. at 507.
404. Cf Hlavac, supra note 18, at 1376. In Frontiero:
the Court did not need to apply strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny to strike down
the.., gender-classification .... It could have applied the rational basis test and
concluded that the means chosen were not rationally related to the government objectives
because the means themselves were based on archaic and overbroad generalizations.
Id.
405. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688.
406. Id. at 688-89.
407. Id.
affidavits, rather than through the more costly hearing process. 4 8
Consequently, he concluded that "the Government's explanation of the
statutory scheme [was], to say the least, questionable. 4 °9 In other words,
Justice Brennan, in effect, held that the means of putting a burden on
servicewomen, but not on servicemen, to prove spousal dependency was not
reasonably or rationally related to the purported ends of administrative
convenience because the statutory scheme would not necessarily result in
410any cost or time savings.
Similarly, in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, the Court unanimously struck
down a provision of the Social Security Act that provided that certain
benefits were payable to the wife and children of a deceased male, but
similar benefits were only payable to the children, but not the husband, of a
deceased female.411 In reaching this conclusion, the Court appeared to apply
rational basis review. Justice Brennan, writing for a majority of the Court,
concluded that the statute suffered from the same infirmity as the statute in
Frontiero.412 It was a "gender-based generalization" 413 concerning those who
are determined to be the "primary supporters of their spouses and
children. 41 4 It "operate[d] ... to deprive women of protection for their
families which men receive as a result of their employment," and to deprive
them "of a portion of... [their] own earnings in order to contribute to the
fund out of which benefits would be paid to others." 415 Such a generalization
"[could not] suffice to justify the denigration of the efforts of women who do
work and whose earnings contribute significantly to their families'
support. '41 6 In other words, it was based on an archaic stereotype "that male
workers' earnings are vital to the support of their families, while the
earnings of female wage earners do not significantly contribute to their
families' support. 4 17
Justice Brennan also explicitly concluded that the gender classification
was not even reasonably or rationally related to its purpose. As he saw it, the
purpose of the benefits at issue were to "provide children deprived of one
parent with the opportunity for the personal attention of the other"418 by
408. Id. at 689-90.
409. Id. at 690.
410. Id. Justice Brennan also thought that under strict scrutiny any distinction based on gender
"solely" for administrative convenience was "arbitrary." Id. at 690.
411. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 637-39 (1975).
412. Id. at 642-43.
413. Id. at 645.
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id. at643.
418. Id. at 648-49.
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permitting "the surviving parent to remain at home to care for a child."41 9
Consequently, the gender distinction was "entirely irrational4 20 since:
[t]he fact that a man is working while there is a wife at home does
not mean that he would, or should be required to, continue to work
if his wife dies... [as] [i]t is no less important for a child to be
cared for by its sole surviving parent when that parent is male rather
than female . 21
In a more closely divided case, the Court, in a five to four decision in
Califano v. Goldfarb, also held unconstitutional provisions of the Social
Security Act that provided certain benefits to widows, but provided similar
benefits to widowers only if they were dependent on their deceased wives
for at least one-half of their support.422 However, once again, a majority of
the Court did not apply intermediate scrutiny. Only Justice Brennan's
plurality opinion purported to apply that standard.4 3 The four dissenters
appeared to apply rational basis review.42 4 Justice Stevens, who agreed that
the distinction was unconstitutional, 42 5 did not clearly apply any particular
standard of review as such. His inquiry was whether there was a "'legitimate
basis for presuming that the rule was actually intended to serve [the]
interest' put forward by the Government as its justification.'426
Despite the lack of consensus as to the appropriate standard of review,
the result is explainable on rational basis grounds. As Justice Brennan saw it,
the case was similar to Frontiero and "indistinguishable" from
Wiesenfeld.427 The distinction discriminated against working females. 42 8 It
419. Id. at 651.
420. Id.
421. Id. at 651-52. Although not agreeing with all of Justice Brennan's reasoning, in a separate
concurring opinion, Justice Rehnquist agreed that the classification "[did] not rationally serve any
valid legislative purpose," id. at 655 (Rehnquist, J., concurring), and Justice Powell, joined by Chief
Justice Burger, could "find no legitimate governmental interest that support[ed] ... [the]
classification." Id. at 655 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Douglas took no part in the case. Id. at
653. Justice Brennan also held that the classification could not be justified as an affirmative action
program for women. See infra notes 567-81 and accompanying text.
422. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 201 (1977).
423. Id. at 210-11.
424. Id. at 235-36, 242 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
425. Id. at 217-24 (Stevens, J., concurring).
426. Id. at 223 (Stevens, J., concurring) (alterations in original) (quoting Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103 (1976)).
427. Id. at 204.
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"result[ed] in the efforts of female workers required to pay social security
taxes producing less protection for their spouses than [was] produced by the
efforts of men. 429  It was the product of an "'archaic and overbroad'
generalization[]" that wives are dependent on their husbands,430 and that,
therefore, "it would save the Government time, money, and effort simply to
pay benefits to all widows, rather than to require proof of dependency of
both sexes. 43' On this view of the underlying facts and policies, the
classification also failed the rational basis test because that was the standard
432applied by a majority of the Court in Frontiero, and apparently
unanimously in Wiesenfeld.433
Justice Stevens, who provided the fifth vote, concluded that the
classification was unconstitutional because it was "merely the accidental
byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about females,' 434 and "something
more than accident is necessary to justify the disparate treatment of persons
who have as strong a claim to equal treatment as do similarly situated
surviving spouses. 4 35 In other words, he apparently agreed with Justice
Brennan that the classification was based on an archaic stereotype. Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the four dissenters, thought the classification was a
type of affirmative action program designed to "ameliorate the
characteristically depressed condition of aged widows '436 by "mak[ing] it
easier for ... [them] to obtain benefits. 4 37 Such a classification was
"rationally justifiable, given available empirical data on the basis of
'administrative convenience,, 438 since "widows, as a practical matter, are
much more likely to be without adequate means of support than are
widowers. 439 In other words, what Justices Brennan and Stevens saw as a
classification based on an archaic stereotype that wives are dependent on
their husbands, Justice Rehnquist saw as a classification based on a real
difference between the economic conditions of widows and widowers.
Similarly, in Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co., the Court
struck down a state statute that precluded widowers from receiving death
benefits for the work related death of their wives unless they could prove
428. See id. at 204-07.
429. Id. at 206-07.
430. Id. (quoting Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975)).
431. Id. at 217.
432. See supra notes 398-402 and accompanying text.
433. See supra notes 411-21 and accompanying text.
434. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 223 (Stevens, J., concurring).
435. Id.
436. Id. at 242 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
437. Id. at 225.
438. Id. at 242.
439. Id. at 234.
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that they were dependent on their earnings or were "mentally or physically
incapacitated from wage earning[s].,,440 However, widows were entitled to
benefits without having to prove dependence. 44 The Missouri Supreme
Court had held that the classification was a type of affirmative action
program designed "'to favor widows, not to disfavor them.' '442 The theory
was that since "most women are dependent on male wage earners,"" 3 they
are in greater need when their spouse dies.44 The Court, eight to one, found
the statute unconstitutional." 5
By this time in the evolution of the doctrine, a majority of the Court was
willing to apply intermediate scrutiny as the articulated standard of review in
gender cases. 446 Justice White, writing for seven Justices, found that the
statute "indisputably" created a gender classification 447 that "discriminate[d]
against both men and women."" 8 It discriminated against "women wage
earners"449 because their husbands were only entitled to benefits if they
could prove dependency or that they were "mentally or physically
incapacitated"; 45° and, it discriminated against widowers because, unlike
widows, they were only entitled to benefits if they could prove "incapacity
or dependency. 45' Justice White found that:
[t]he only justification offered.., for not treating males and
females alike ... [was] the assertion that most women are
dependent on male wage earners and that it is more efficient to
presume dependency in the case of women than to engage in case-
to-case determination, whereas individualized inquiries in the
postulated few cases in which men might be dependent are not
prohibitively costly.
452
440. Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 144-45 (1980).
441. Id. at 145-46.
442. Id. at 150 (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 583 S.W.2d 162, 168 (Mo. 1979),
rev'd, 446 U.S. 142 (1980)).
443. Id. at 151.
444. Id. at 150-51.
445. Justice Rehnqist was the lone dissenter. See infra note 469.
446. Wengler, 446 U.S. at 150.
447. Id. at 147.
448. Id.
449. Id. at 151.
450. Id. at 147.
451. Id. at 149.
452. Id. at 151.
Nonetheless, he accepted the proposition that "[p]roviding for needy
spouses ' 453 was "an important governmental objective."454 However, he
concluded that "those defending the discrimination" 45 failed to meet their
"burden ' 56 of demonstrating that "the discriminatory means employed"
457
were "substantially related to the achievement ' 48 of the State's asserted
important governmental objective.459
Although Justice White clearly analyzed the case in the framework of
intermediate scrutiny, the result in the case did not depend on the application
of that standard. For the most part, the result turned on the application of
precedent. Justice White found that the gender discrimination at issue was
the "kind of discrimination against working women" that the Court found
"unjustified" in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, Califano v. Goldfarb, and
Frontiero v. Richardson.460 He also relied on Frontiero, Reed v. Reed, and
Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Goldfarb6 1 for the proposition that
the gender discrimination could not be justified "by the mere claim that it
would be inconvenient to individualize determinations about widows as well
as widowers. ' '4 62 Of course, in Reed, the Court unanimously applied rational
basis review463 and appeared to do the same in Wiesenfeld.464 In Frontiero, a
majority of the Court applied that standard, 4 65 and in Goldfarb, only a
plurality of the Court, not including Justice Stevens, applied intermediate
scrutiny. 66 The basic rationale of Frontiero, Wiesenfeld, and Goldfarb was
that the gender discriminations at issue with respect to entitlement of
benefits were based on archaic stereotypes as to the financial dependency of
women on men;4 67 and in Reed and Frontiero, the Court rejected the
administrative convenience argument offered to justify the gender
discrimination involved in those cases.468 Given his reliance on these cases,
Justice White, in effect, held that based on the underlying facts and policies,
the classification was not reasonably or rationally related to its asserted
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. Id. at 150.
458. Id.
459. Id.
460. Id. at 147-49.
461. Id. at 152.
462. Id.
463. See supra notes 349-52 and accompanying text.
464. See supra notes 411-21 and accompanying text.
465. See supra notes 398-403 and accompanying text.
466. See supra notes 422-26 and accompanying text.
467. See supra notes 398-403, 411-35 and accompanying text.
468. See supra notes 349-52, 398-4 10 and accompanying text.
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purpose. Indeed, in a footnote, he noted that "we accept the importance of
the state goal of helping needy spouses, but.., the.., law in our view is not
'reasonably designed' to achieve this goal. 469
2. Situations Where the Genders are not Similarly Situated
On the other hand, the Court has upheld gender classifications involving
pregnancy and military affairs. The principal rationale of these cases has
been that the genders were not similarly situated with respect to the
classifications at issue. Here again, the verbalization of the standard of
review as "substantially related to important governmental objectives" has
had little or no effect on the outcome of the cases. Instead, these cases are
also explainable on rational basis grounds.
a. Pregnancy
For example, in Michael M. v. Superior Court, the Court, five to four,
upheld the constitutionality of a California statutory rape statute that made
the male, but not the female, criminally liable for "'an act of sexual
intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator,
where the female [was] under the age of 18 years.' 470 Despite the fact that,
by this time in the evolution of the doctrine, a majority of the Court had
accepted intermediate scrutiny as the verbalization of the standard of review
in several prior gender cases, 47' only three members of the Court purported
to apply that standard in this case. Justice Rehnquist's four Justice plurality
opinion 472 held that the statute was "sufficiently related to the State's
469. Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 148 n.4 (1980) (citation omitted). In a
concurring opinion, Justice Stevens argued that the statute discriminated against males, not females.
Id. at 154 (Stevens, J., concurring). Nonetheless, without articulating any particular standard of
review, he also found the statute unconstitutional on the grounds that the State "failed to justify the
disparate treatment of persons who have as strong a claim to equal treatment as do similarly situated
surviving spouses." Id. at 155. Justice Rehnquist dissented apparently based on his dissent in
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 253-54 (1977). Id. at 153-54 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See
supra notes 436-39 and accompanying text.
470. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 466 (1981) (plurality opinion) (quoting CAL.
PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West Supp. 1981)).
471. Prior to Michael M, a majority of the Court applied intermediate scrutiny in Kirchberg v.
Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981), Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980),
and Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
472. The plurality consisted of Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist, Stewart and Powell.
Michael M, 450 U.S. at 465. Although he joined the plurality opinion, Justice Stewart also filed a
concurring opinion in which he basically agreed with Justice Rehnquist's reasoning. Id. at 476-81
237
objectives to pass constitutional muster., 47 3 However, his analysis was
consistent with reasoned decision-making under the rational basis test.474
Justice Rehnquist held that gender classifications are "not invidious ' 47
if they are based on "the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated in
certain circumstances. 476 In this case, he concluded that men and women
were not "similarly situated ''477 as to pregnancy.478 He noted that the
Supreme Court of California had accepted the State's assertion that the
purpose of the statute was "to prevent illegitimate teenage pregnancies.4 79
He said that he was "satisfied" that this was "at least one of the 'purposes' of
the statute. 48° Consequently, he found that the statutory classification was
not based on a stereotype.48' Instead, it was based on a real difference
between men and women, as the genders "are not similarly situated with
respect to the problems and the risks of sexual intercourse.4 t 2 This is so
since "[o]nly women may become pregnant, and they suffer
disproportionately the profound physical, emotional, and psychological
consequences of sexual activity. ' 483 He reasoned that since "virtually all of
the significant harmful and inescapably identifiable consequences of teenage
pregnancy fall on the young female, a legislature acts well within its
authority when it elects to punish only the participant who, by nature, suffers
few of the consequences of his conduct.",414 Furthermore, "the risk of
pregnancy itself constitutes a substantial deterrence to young
females[,] [but] ... [n]o similar natural sanctions deter males. 485 As a
result, "[a] criminal sanction imposed solely on males ... serves to roughly
'equalize' the deterrents on the sexes. 486 Obviously, Justice Rehnquist
thought the prevention of teenage pregnancy was a legitimate purpose and
that punishing the male, but not the female, was reasonably and rationally
(Stewart, J., concurring).
473. Id. at 473.
474. See Hlavac, supra note 18, at 1369 ("In Michael M... Justice Rehnquist gave indirect lip
service to the intermediate-scrutiny test but actually applied what amounted to the traditional
rational-basis test.").
475. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 469.
476. Id.
477. Id. at 471.
478. See id.
479. Id. at 470.
480. Id.
481. Id. at 476.
482. Id. at 471.
483. Id.
484. Id. at 473.
485. Id.
486. Id.
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related to that objective.487 Indeed, he specifically said that it was "hardly
unreasonable for a legislature acting to protect minor females to exclude
them from punishment.,
488
Justice Blackmun, who supplied the fifth vote, appeared to apply
rational basis review. 489 He reasoned that the statute was "a sufficiently
reasoned and constitutional effort to control the problem ... of forced or
unwanted conception.., at its inception. ' '49° Justice Stevens, dissenting, also
487. Justice Rehnquist also concluded that the classification did not discriminate against females.
Id. at 475. Instead, it put a "burden on males ... not shared by females." Id. at 476. However, he
found nothing to suggest that men, because of past discrimination or particular disadvantage, are in
need of the special solicitude of the courts. Id.
Justice Rehnquist also thought that it was appropriate to defer to the State on the question of whether
preventing teenage pregnancies could be achieved by a gender-neutral statute that punished both the
man and the woman. Id. He noted that "[t]he relevant inquiry ... [was] not whether the statute [was]
drawn as precisely as it might have been, but whether the line chosen ... [was] within constitutional
limitations." Id. at 473. He accepted the State's argument that such a "statute would frustrate its
interest in effective enforcement" since "a female is surely less likely to report violations of the
statute if she... [is] subject to criminal prosecution." Id. at 473-74. Furthermore, he thought that at
least "[i]t [could] be plausibly argued that a gender-neutral statute would produce fewer prosecutions
than the statute at issue here." Id. at 474 n. 10. He said that "whether a statute is substantially related
to its asserted goals is at best an opaque [question]." Id. Thus:
[w]here such differing speculations as to the effect of a statute are plausible, .... it [is]
appropriate to defer to the decision of the [State] Supreme Court, "armed as it [is] with
the knowledge of the facts and circumstances concerning the passage and potential
impact of [the statute], and familiar with the milieu in which [the] provision [will]
operate."
Id. (quoting Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378-79 (1967)).
Justice Rehnquist also dismissed the assertion that the statute was "impermissibly overbroad"
because it applied to "prepubescent females, who [were], by definition, incapable of becoming
pregnant." Id. at 475. He noted that the statute "could well be justified on the grounds that very
young females are particularly susceptible to physical injury from sexual intercourse[,]" but that, in
any event, "it [was] ludicrous to suggest that the Constitution requires the ... legislature to limit the
scope of its rape statute to older teenagers and exclude young girls." ld. In addition, he rejected the
argument that the statutory scheme was "flawed because it presume[d] that as between two persons
under 18, the male [was] the culpable aggressor." Id. He held that the statute was not based on such
an assumption; rather it was "an attempt by a legislature to prevent illegitimate teenage pregnancy
by providing an additional deterrent for men" who, even if they [were] young, [could] cause "the
harm sought to be prevented." Id.
488. Id. at 473.
489. Justice Blackmun said he was applying the test "exemplified" in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 197 (1976), Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S.
636 (1975), Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), and Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). Id. at
483 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In the latter four, at least a majority of the Court applied rational
basis. See supra notes 349-52, 411-21 and accompanying text; infra notes 515-23, 543-57, 567-81
and accompanying text. Moreover, the former is explainable under rational basis review, and, in any
event, a majority of the Court applied something less than intermediate scrutiny. See infra notes 660-
75 and accompanying text.
490. Michael M, 450 U.S. at 482 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
appeared to apply rational basis review. However, in his view, "from the
point of view of society's interest in preventing the risk-creating conduct
from occurring at all, it is irrational to exempt 50% of the potential
violators."'49' He also thought that the classification would be
unconstitutional if it were based on the assumption that the "decision to
engage in the risk-creating conduct is always - or at least typically - a male
decision, 492 because such an assumption might "reflect nothing more than an
irrational prejudice." 493
Only Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and White, applied
intermediate scrutiny.494 He concluded that the statutory classification was
unconstitutional 495 because it was not "substantially related to the
achievement of an important governmental objective.4 96 In his view, the
State had failed to prove that, as compared to a gender-based law, a gender-
neutral law would be either more "difficult to enforce' ' or a "less effective
deterrent than a gender-based law."498 Although Justice Brennan purported
to apply intermediate scrutiny, he also found, in effect, that the classification
failed rational basis review. His reading of the statute's history led him to
the conclusion that its underlying purpose was not "to reduce the incidence
of teenage pregnancies. '499 Rather, it was "initially designed to further...
outmoded sexual stereotypes" 500 that women, but not men, need to preserve
"their chastity." 50' In other words, what Justice Rehnquist saw as a
classification based on a real difference, Justice Brennan saw as a
classification based on a stereotype. On this view of the facts, the
classification would be unconstitutional based on Reed v. Reed and its
progeny.°2
491. Id. at 499 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
492. Id. at 501 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
493. Id. Justice Stevens also rejected the argument that the classification could be justified as a
way "to encourage females to inform against their male partners," because he could see no basis for
"defining the exempt class entirely by reference to sex rather than by reference to a more neutral
criterion." Id. at 502 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He concluded that "[e]ven if... there actually [was]
some speculative basis for treating equally guilty males and females differently ... any such
speculative justification would be outweighed by the paramount interest in evenhanded enforcement
of the law." Id.
494. See id. at 488-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
495. Id. at 488 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
496. Id. at 489-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
497. Id. at 494 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
498. Id.
499. Id. at 496 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
500. Id.
501. See id. at 494-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
502. See source cited supra note 360.
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The Court, six to three, also upheld a distinction between men and
women based on pregnancy in Geduldig v. Aiello.5 03 The issue in that case
was the constitutionality of a state disability program that excluded benefits
for normal pregnancy.0 4 The majority applied rational basis review. 50 5 As
they viewed the underlying facts, the case was not one "involving
discrimination based upon gender as such ' '506 since no one was excluded
from benefits based on gender.50 7 They reasoned that "[w]hile it is true that
only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that every legislative
classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification like those
considered in Reed... and Frontiero ... ,508 In their view, "[n]ormal
pregnancy is an objectively identifiable physical condition with unique
characteristics. '" 50 9 Thus:
[a]bsent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere
pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the
members of one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally
free to include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of
legislation such as this on any reasonable basis, just as with respect
to any other physical condition.510
Consequently, they held that the exclusion was "rationally ' '5 " related to the
State's "legitimate interest" in cost saving.512 Justice Brennan, writing for
the three dissenters, saw the underlying facts differently. In his view, the
case involved gender discrimination.513 At this point in the evolution of the
standard, he would have held the statute unconstitutional applying strict
scrutiny.
4
503. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
504. Id. at 494-97.
505. See id. at 495-96.
506. Id. at 496 n.20.
507. Id.
508. Id.
509. Id.
510. Id.
511. See id. at 495.
512. Id. at 496. The majority concluded that the exclusion of pregnancy served three legitimate
state interests related to cost: "maintaining the self-supporting nature of its insurance program";
"distributing the available resources in such a way as to keep benefit payments at an adequate level
for disabilities that [were] covered"; and "maintaining the contribution rate at a level that [would]
not unduly burden participating employees, particularly low-income employees . I.." Id.
513. Id. at 501 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
514. Id. at 502-05 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
b. Military Affairs
In Schlesinger v. Ballard, a five to four majority of the Court upheld
federal statutes that gave certain female naval officers a longer period of
time to obtain promotion or be discharged than was available to male
officers.1 5 Applying rational basis review,516 Justice Stewart, writing for the
majority, found the classification was based on "complete rationality. ' '517 In
reaching this conclusion, he noted that the genders were not similarly
situated with respect to promotion opportunities since, at the time, female
officers were restricted with respect to "participation in combat and in most
sea duty. '5 8 He hypothesized that "Congress may ... quite rationally have
believed that women line officers had less opportunity for promotion than
did their male counterparts, and that a longer period of tenure.., would...
be consistent with the goal to provide women with 'fair and equitable career
advancement programs. ,,5'9 He also noted that Congress has "broad
constitutional power" and "responsibility" with respect to "the Armed
Forces," whose "primary business" is "'to fight or be ready to fight
wars.' 520 Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Douglas, Justice Marshall, and
Justice White "for the most part, 521 dissented. Although, at this point in
time, Justice Brennan was still insisting that strict scrutiny was the
appropriate standard of review in gender cases,522 he did not even think that
the classification passed the rational basis test.
5 23
515. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 501-05 (1975).
516. Id. at 508-10.
517. Id. at 509.
518. Id. at 508. At the time of this case women could "'not be assigned to duty in aircraft that
[were] engaged in combat missions nor... be assigned to duty on vessels of the Navy other than
hospital ships and transports."' Id. (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 6015 (1975)).
519. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 90-216, at 5 (1967)).
520. Id. at 510 (quoting United States exrel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955)).
521. Id. 521 (White, J., dissenting).
522. Id. at 511 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
523. Id. at 511-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Apart from the standard of review, Justice Brennan
disagreed with the majority concerning the underlying facts and policies. In his view, there was
"nothing in the statutory scheme or the legislative history to support the supposition that Congress
intended, by assuring women but not men line lieutenants in the Navy a 13-year tenure, to
compensate women for other forms of disadvantage visited upon them by the Navy." Id. at 511
(Brennan, J., dissenting). He also noted that "women do not compete directly with men for
promotion in the Navy." Id. at 518 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Instead, "selection boards for women
are separately convened,.., the number of women officers to be selected for promotion is separately
determined,... promotion zones for women are separately designated,.., and women's fitness for
promotion is judged as compared to other women .. ." Id. Thus, he found "it hard to see how
women are disadvantaged in their opportunity for promotion by the fact that their duties in the Navy
are limited, or how increasing their tenure before separation for nonpromotion is necessary to
compensate for other disadvantages." Id. at 518-19 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Given his view of the
underlying facts and policies, Justice Brennan thought that "the gender based classification ... [was]
not related, rationally or otherwise, to any legitimate legislative purpose fairly to be inferred from
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Similarly, in Rostker v. Goldberg, a majority of the Court upheld a
congressional statute that authorized the President to require registration for
conscription into the armed forces for men between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-six, but that did not authorize or provide funds for the registration of
women. 524 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the six
Justice majority, noted that the "interest in raising and supporting armies is
an 'important governmental interest' within meaning of intermediate
scrutiny. 525 However, he did not purport to apply that standard. Instead, he
held that Congress' failure to require the registration of women was
constitutional because it was "not only sufficiently but also closely related to
Congress' purpose in authorizing registration. 52 6 He based his conclusion
on two main policy reasons that had nothing to do with the verbalization of
the standard of review as "substantially related to important governmental
objectives."Justice Rehnquist's first policy reason was that deference should
be accorded to Congress' decision both because "Congress is a coequal
branch of government whose Members take the same oath.., to uphold the
Constitution of the United States" as do members of the Court,527 and
because, in this case, Congress was acting within its explicit "authority over
national defense and military affairs ... under [Article I, Section 8, Clauses
12-14 of the Constitution]."528
the statutory scheme or its history, and [could not] be sustained." Id. at 511-12 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
524. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 59 (1981).
525. Id. at 70.
526. Id. at 79.
527. Id. at 64.
528. Id. at 64-65. Justice Rehnquist noted that "customary deference accorded the judgments of
Congress is certainly appropriate when, as here, Congress specifically considered the question of the
Act's constitutionality." Id. at 64. Furthermore, he pointed out that "[n]ot only is the scope of
Congress' constitutional power in this area broad, but the lack of competence on the part of the
courts is marked." Id. at 65. In addition, he also noted that Congress' decision to exempt women
from registration was not the "'accidental by-product of a traditional way of thinking about
females."' Id. at 74 (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977)). The issue "not only
received considerable national attention and was the subject of wide-ranging public debate, but was
also extensively considered by Congress in hearings, floor debate, and in committee." Id. at 72.
Furthermore, he noted that the legislative history indicated that:
assuming that a small number of women could be drafted for noncombat roles, Congress
simply did not consider it worth the added burdens of including women in draft and
registration plans [;] ... Congress also concluded that whatever the need for women for
noncombat roles during mobilization.., it could be met by volunteers[;] [and] ... [m]ost
significantly, Congress determined that staffing noncombat positions with women during
a mobilization would be positively detrimental to the important goal of military
flexibility.
Id. at 81-82.
However, the principal reason for his decision was "[t]he fact that
Congress and the Executive have decided that women should not serve in
combat,"52 9 the constitutionality of which was not challenged in the case.
5 30
Thus, he reasoned that Congress was "fully justifie[d] ''531 in excluding
women from "registration, since the purpose of registration is to develop a
pool of potential combat troops., 532  Consequently, "'the gender
classification [was] not invidious, but rather realistically reflect[ed] the fact
that the sexes are not similarly situated'"; 53  and, "[t]he Constitution requires
that Congress treat similarly situated persons similarly, not that it engage in
gestures of superficial equality. '534 Thus, he "conclude[d] that Congress
acted well within its constitutional authority when it authorized the
registration of men, and not women. 535 In other words, he found the
classification to be reasonable, rational, and legitimate.
Justice White, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented. However, he did
not apply any particular standard of review.536 He simply had a different
view of the underlying facts and policies. On his view of the record, he
could "discern no adequate justification for ... discrimination between men
and women. 537 In other words, he apparently could not find any conceivable
justification for the classification. On this view of the case, the classification
was not even reasonable or rational. Only Justice Marshall, joined by Justice
Brennan, dissenting, applied intermediate scrutiny.53 However, he too
basically just disagreed with the majority's analysis of the underlying facts
and policies.539
529. Id. at 79.
530. Id. at 83 (White, J., dissenting).
531. Id. at 79.
532. Id.
533. Id. (quoting Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981)).
534. Id.
535. Id. at 83.
536. See id. at 83-86 (White, J., dissenting).
537. Id. at 85-86 (White, J., dissenting).
538. Id. at 87-88 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
539. Justice Marshall's basic policy point was that the majority had put "its imprimatur on one of
the most potent remaining public expressions of 'ancient canards about the proper role of women"'
Id. at 86 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corporation., 400 U.S. 542,
545 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring)). He also rejected the majority's analysis that women could be
excluded from registration because "the purpose of the registration [was] to prepare for a draft of
combat troops." id. at 94 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In his view, there was no substantial relationship
between the means of "excluding women from registration" and the end of "preparing for a draft of
combat troops." Id. He noted that "registering women in no way obstructs the governmental interest
in preparing for a draft of combat troops" since "the Government makes no claim that preparing for
a draft of combat troops cannot be accomplished just as effectively by registering both men and
women but drafting only men if only men turn out to be needed." Id. at 95 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Furthermore, as he read the legislative history, "conscripts would also be needed to staff a variety of
support positions having no prerequisite of combat eligibility, and which therefore could be filled by
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Also, in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney the issue was the
constitutionality of a civil service veteran preference program that had the
effect of favoring men over women since more men serve in the armed
forces than do women.540 In upholding the program, Justice Stewart, writing
for the majority, stated that intermediate scrutiny was the proper standard of
review in gender cases. 541 However, that standard of review had nothing to
do with the result. The actual holding in the case was simply that the
challenger had failed to establish that the program had a discriminatory
purpose.
542
3. Affirmative Action for Women
In another line of cases, the Court has considered the constitutionality of
gender classifications that purport to be justified on the ground that they are
a type of affirmative action program for women. These cases also are
explainable on rational basis review. Again, the initial decisions resolved the
issues based on that standard.
women," and "[tihe Defense Department... concluded that there are no military reasons that would
justify excluding women from registration." Id. at 98-99 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Consequently,
Justice Marshall concluded that "combat restrictions [could not] by themselves supply the
constitutionally required justification for the ... gender-based classification ... [s]ince the
classification preclude[d] women from being drafted to fill positions for which they would be
qualified and useful." Id. at 101 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Marshall also concluded that the exclusion of women from registration could not be justified
on the ground that there was "no 'military need' to draft women," id at 104 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting), since those needed for noncombat roles could be obtained through volunteers. Id at 105
(Marshall, J., dissenting). He argued that "since the purpose of registration [was] to protect against
unanticipated shortages of volunteers, it [was] difficult to see how excluding women from
registration [could] be justified by conjectures about the expected number of female volunteers." Id.
He also found in the legislative record that "the Defense Department's best estimate [was] that in the
event of a mobilization requiring reinstitution of the draft, there [would] not be enough women
volunteers to fill the positions for which women would be eligible." Id. at 105-06 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). In addition, Justice Marshall rejected the majority's assertion that "'Congress
determined that staffing noncombat positions with women during a mobilization would be positively
detrimental to the important goal of military flexibility."' Id. at 106 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(quoting Id. at 81-82). As he read the legislative history, "it demonstrate[d] that drafting very large
numbers of women would frustrate the achievement of a number of important governmental
objectives that relate to the ultimate goal of maintaining 'an adequate armed strength ... to insure
the security of this Nation."' Id. at 112 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting 52 U.S.C. app. § 451(b)
(1981)). However, in his view, this did "not enable the Government to carry its burden of
demonstrating that completely excluding women from the draft by excluding them from registration
substantially further[ed] important governmental objectives." Id.
540. Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 259, 269-70 (1979).
541. Id.at273.
542. Id. at 276-80.
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a. Compensatory Classifications
Thus, in Kahn v. Shevin, the issue was the constitutionality of a state
statute that gave a five hundred dollar property tax exemption to widows, but
not widowers.543 Relying on Reed v. Reed, Justice Douglas, writing for a six
to three majority, upheld the statute on the grounds that it was reasonable. 44
The underlying premise of his opinion was that men and women were not
similarly situated with respect to the loss of a spouse. He reasoned that "the
financial difficulties confronting the lone woman ... exceed those facing the
man," 545 and that "[w]hether from overt discrimination or from the
socialization process of a male-dominated culture, the job market is
inhospitable to the woman seeking any but the lowest paid jobs. 5 46 Thus,
"[w]hile the widower can usually continue in the occupation which preceded
his spouse's death, in many cases the widow will find herself suddenly
forced into a job market with which she is unfamiliar, and in which, because
of her former economic dependency, she will have fewer skills to offer.
5 47
Consequently, he concluded that the statute was a reasonable tax law
"designed to further the state policy of cushioning the financial impact of
spousal loss upon the sex for which that loss imposes a disproportionately
heavy burden.''548 In other words, he thought that the classification was
based not on a stereotype, but on a real difference between widows and
widowers with respect to gender discrimination in the job market.5 49
543. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 352 n.2 (1974).
544. Id. at 355. Justice Douglas also noted "'that States have large leeway in making
classifications' with respect to taxation, id. (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lakeshore Auto Parts Co., 410
U.S. 356, 359 (1973)), and that "courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the
judgments of legislative bodies." Id. at 356 n.9 (quoting Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730
(1963)).
545. Id. at 353.
546. Id.
547. Id. at 354.
548. Id. at 355.
549. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented. At the time of this case these Justices
were still arguing that strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review in gender cases. Id. at
357-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan, however, agreed that "the statute serve[d] a
compelling governmental interest," id. at 358 (Brennan, J., dissenting), in addressing the "economic
disparity between men and women." Id. at 359 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, he thought the
statute was unconstitutional because it was not narrowly drawn. Id. at 358 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
He reasoned that it was "plainly overinclusive" in that "the ... exemption [could] be obtained by a
financially independent heiress as well as by an unemployed widow with dependent children." Id. at
360 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He noted that a method of "narrowing the class of widow
beneficiaries ... [was] readily available." Id. The State could simply redraft the form necessary to
obtain an exemption "to exclude widows who earn[ed] annual incomes, or possess[ed] assets, in
excess of specified amounts." Id. Justice White also dissented. Id. at 360-62 (White, J., dissenting).
He also applied strict scrutiny. Id. at 361 (White, J., dissenting). He thought that the statute was not
only overinclusive as to widows, but also underinclusive as to needy men and single women. Id.
Justice Douglas responded to the dissenters by characterizing their opinions as "us[ing] the Equal
246
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Similarly, in Schlesinger v. Ballard, a five to four majority of the Court,
applying rational basis review,55 ° upheld federal statutes that in effect
provided for mandatory discharge of male line naval officers who had been
twice passed over for promotion, but provided for the mandatory discharge
of female line naval officers only if they had been passed over for promotion
after thirteen years.551 The majority found that the classification was based
on "complete rationality., 552 The underlying premise of the opinion was
"that male and female line naval officers in the Navy [were] not similarly
situated with respect to opportunities for professional service" 553 since, at the
time of the case, female officers were restricted with respect to
"participation in combat and in most sea duty., 554 Consequently, the
classification was not based "on overbroad generalizations '555  or
"administrative convenience. 556 Instead, it was designed to compensate
women by providing them with "'fair and equitable career advancement
programs.'
557
Subsequently, in a per curiam opinion in Califano v. Webster, the Court
upheld provisions of the Social Security Act that provided, for purposes of
certain retirement benefits, that "a female wage earner could exclude from
the computation of her 'average monthly wage' three more lower earning
years than a similarly situated male wage earner could exclude. 558
Consequently, "[t]his would result in a slightly higher 'average monthly
wage' and a correspondingly higher level of monthly old-age benefits for the
retired female wage earner., 559 Although by this time in the evolution of the
doctrine the Court purported to apply intermediate scrutiny to gender
classifications, 560 the result in the case did not depend on that verbalization
Protection Clause as a vehicle for reinstating notions of substantive due process ... [by]
substitut[ing] their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies." Id. at 356
n.10.
550. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508-10 (1975).
551. Id. at 501-05.
552. Id. at 509.
553. Id. at 508.
554. Id; see source cited supra note 518.
555. Ballard, 419 U.S. at 507.
556. Id. at 510.
557. Id. at 511 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 90-216, at 5 (1967)). Justice Brennan, joined by Justice
Douglas, Justice Marshall, and Justice White "for the most part," dissented. See supra notes 521-23
and accompanying text.
558. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 315-16 (1977).
559. Id. at 316.
560. Id. at 316-17. This was the first case in which a majority of the Court unequivocally applied
intermediate scrutiny to a gender classification. See sources cited supra note 112.
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of the standard. Instead, the Court upheld the classification because it
viewed it as being "analogous to those upheld in Kahn and Ballard,"56' both
of which applied rational basis review. 62 Consequently, the classification
was viewed as being reasonable, rational, and legitimate. The Court
reasoned that:
[t]he more favorable treatment of the female wage earner enacted
here was not a result of "archaic and overbroad generalizations"
about women ... or of "the role-typing society has long imposed"
upon women ... such as casual assumptions that women are "the
weaker sex" or are more likely to be child-rearers or dependents. 6 a
Instead, the legislative history supported the conclusion that the
congressional purpose 564 was "'the permissible one of redressing our
society's longstanding disparate treatment of women' ' 565  by
"compensat[ing] women for past economic discrimination., 566
b. Discriminatory Classifications
On the other hand, in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, the Court, apparently
applying rational basis review, struck down a provision of the Social
Security Act that provided that certain benefits were payable to the wife and
children of a deceased male, but similar benefits were only payable to the
children, but not the husband, of a deceased female.167 The Appellant
argued, in part, that the provision was constitutional because it was
"reasonably designed to compensate women beneficiaries as a group for the
economic difficulties which still confront women who seek to support
themselves and their families. 5 68 In his majority opinion, Justice Brennan
rejected this argument. Citing cases that had applied rational basis review, he
asserted that the "Court need not in equal protection cases accept at face
561. Webster, 430 U.S. at 317.
562. See supra notes 543-57 and accompanying text.
563. Webster, 430 U.S. at 317 (quoting Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975); Stanton
v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 15 (1975)).
564. Id. at 318.
565. Id. at 317 (quoting Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 209 n.8 (1977)).
566. Id. at 3 18. The Court noted that the result in the case was not affected by the fact "[t]hat
Congress changed its mind in 1972 and equalized the treatment of men and women." Id. at 320.
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, filed a concurring
opinion. He was "happy to concur in the Court's judgement," but found it "somewhat difficult to
distinguish the Social Security provision upheld here from that struck down ... in Califano v.
Goldfarb." Id. at 321 (Burger, C.J., concurring); see also supra notes 422-39 and accompanying text;
infra notes 596-612 and accompanying text.
567. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 637-38 (1975).
568. Id. at 648.
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value assertions of legislative purposes, when an examination of the
legislative scheme and its history demonstrates that the asserted purpose
could not have been a goal of the legislation., 569 Consequently, "the mere
recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield
which protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes."57 He engaged
in a reasoned analysis and found that it was "apparent both from the
statutory scheme itself and from the legislative history.., that Congress'
purpose in providing benefits to young widows with children was not to
provide an income to women who were, because of economic
discrimination, unable to provide for themselves. 57' Instead, the statute was
"linked ... directly to responsibility for minor children. 5 12 It was designed
to "enabl[e] the surviving parent to remain at home to care for a child. 573
Given this purpose, the classification was "entirely irrational" 574 because
even the "fact that a man is working while there is a wife at home does not
mean that he would, or should be required to, continue to work if his wife
dies. ,,575
Justice Brennan also found that the classification was unnecessary. He
noted that:
to the extent that Congress legislated on the presumption that
women as a group would choose to forgo work to care for children
while men would not, the statutory structure, independent of the
gender-based classification, would deny or reduce benefits to those
men who conform to the presumed norm and are not hampered by
their child-care responsibilities. 76
Consequently, the distinction between husbands and wives was "gratuitous;
without it, the statutory scheme would only provide benefits to those men
569. Id. at 648 n.16 (citing Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 634 (1974); United States Dep't
of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)).
570. Id. at 648.
571. Id.
572. Id.
573. Id. at651.
574. Id.
575. Id. at 651-52. Although not agreeing with all of Justice Brennan's reasoning, in separate
concurring opinions, Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, agreed
that the classification failed the rational basis test. See supra note 42 1.
576. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 652-53. Under the statutory scheme, women were entitled to benefits
if they were not working; if working, the benefit amount was reduced. Id. at 640-41.
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who [were] in fact similarly situated to the women the statute aid[ed]. '577
Since the statute could not "be explained as an attempt to provide for the
special problems of women,' 578 it was unconstitutional because it suffered
from the same infirmity as the statute in Frontiero v. Richardson.57 9 It was a
"gender-based generalization""58 concerning those who are the "primary
supporters of their spouses and children."58'
Not only did Justice Brennan purport to apply rational basis review in
Wiesenfeld, but also his analysis was consistent with that standard of review.
Recall that under rational basis review, a classification is upheld if there are
any conceivable or plausible reasons to support it.582 However, there is
nothing in the theory of rational basis review, or in the precedents, that
requires the Court, in the words of Justice Brennan, to "accept at face value
assertions of legislative purposes. '583 Indeed the precedents are to the
contrary. 584 Even under rational basis review, the Court still "insist[s] on
knowing the relation between the classification adopted and the object to be
attained." 585 Consequently, it still must engage in a reasoned analysis of the
underlying facts and policies to determine whether there are reasons, real or
plausible, to support the classification, and whether they are rationally
related to some legitimate government purpose. 86 A classification will only
be upheld if the government's purpose is in fact legitimate and if such
reasons for it can be articulated. 87 While it is certainly true, as a general
matter, that the legislature's actual purpose is irrelevant for purposes of
rational basis review,588 the asserted purpose still must be conceivable or
plausible. 89 It is certainly hard to see how an asserted purpose can be
conceivable or plausible if, as Justice Brennan asserted, "an examination of
the legislative scheme and its history demonstrates that ... [it] could not
have been a goal of the legislation." 590 Cases such as FCC v. Beach
Communications, Inc. are not to the contrary. In that case, the challenger of a
classification argued that Congress did not intend the purpose ascribed to it
577. Id. at 653.
578. Id.
579. Id. at 642-43.
580. Id. at 645.
581. Id. Justice Brennan also held that the classification was not reasonably or rationally related to
its asserted ends. See supra text accompanying notes 411-21.
582. See supra notes 287-97 and accompanying text.
583. See supra note 569 and accompanying text.
584. See cases cited supra note 281.
585. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1995).
586. See supra notes 273-333 and accompanying text.
587. See id.
588. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
589. See supra notes 282-322 and accompanying text.
590. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n.16 (1975).
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by the Court.59' The latter said that Congress' actual purpose was
irrelevant.592 However, in terms of plausibility, there is surely a difference
between an assertion that the legislature did not intend a particular purpose,
and the assertion that the legislature could not have intended that purpose.
Justice Brennan's additional assertion in Wiesenfeld, that the gender
distinction could not be justified as an attempt to compensate women
because it was gratuitous, 593 is also consistent with rational basis review.
Even under rational basis review, a classification must be reasonably or
rationally related to a constitutionally permissible purpose.594 Justice
Brennan can be understood as saying that gender classifications can only be
justified as affirmative action programs if they are necessary "to provide for
the special problems of women." 595 Such programs are not reasonable,
rational, or constitutionally legitimate if they are unnecessary or merely
gratuitous.
The subsequent cases that have refused to accept compensatory
justifications for gender classifications have relied for the most part on
Justice Brennan's analysis in Wiesenfeld. In Califano v. Goldfarb, the Court,
in a five to four decision, held unconstitutional other provisions of the Social
Security Act that provided certain benefits to widows, but provided similar
benefits to widowers only if they were dependent on their deceased wives
for at least one half of their support.596 However, the Court was divided on
the appropriate standard of review as well as on whether the statute was a
permissible compensatory measure for females, or whether it involved
invidious discrimination against them. Applying rational basis review,
597
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the four dissenters, found "implicit" in the
classification a "legislative judgment ... that widows, as a practical matter,
are much more likely to be without adequate means of support than are
widowers. 598 Consequently, he viewed the case as involving a type of
affirmative action program designed to "ameliorate the characteristically
depressed condition of aged widows" 599 by "mak[ing] it easier for... [them]
591. See FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 318 (1993).
592. Id.
593. See Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 652-53.
594. See supra notes 308-29 and accompanying text.
595. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 653.
596. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 201 (1977).
597. See id. at 235-36 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
598. Id. at 234 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
599. Id. at 242 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
to obtain benefits. 6 °° Such a classification was "rationally justifiable, given
available empirical data, on the basis of 'administrative convenience', 60 1
since "widows, as a practical matter, are much more likely to be without
adequate means of support than are widowers. 6 2 In other words, Justice
Rehnquist saw the classification as being based on a real difference between
the economic conditions of widows and widowers.
Justice Brennan, writing for the four Justice plurality, rejected the
argument that the gender distinction could be justified as a program to
compensate needy widows. He explicitly applied intermediate scrutiny.60 3
He said the classification could only be upheld if it was substantially related
to important governmental objectives,60 4 and that "justifications that suffice
for non-gender-based classifications in the social welfare area do not
necessarily justify gender discriminations., 605 Nonetheless, his analysis of
the issue did not depend on the application of that standard. He applied the
same type of reasoned analysis here as in Wiesenfeld, in which he appeared
to apply rational basis review.60 6 He examined the legislative history and
concluded that the:
only conceivable justification for writing the presumption of wives'
dependency into the statute [was] the assumption,... based simply
on "archaic and overbroad" generalizations, that it would save the
Government time, money, and effort simply to pay benefits to all
widows, rather than to require proof of dependency of both sexes.607
Consequently, the distinction was "precisely the situation faced in Frontiero
and Wiesenfeld., 60 ' Being based on an "'archaic and overbroad'
generalizatio[n]," the classification was unconstitutional.60 9
Justice Stevens, who provided the fifth vote for striking down the
statute, appeared to apply the rational basis test.610 In his view, the
classification was "merely the accidental byproduct of a traditional way of
600. Id. at 225 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
601. Id. at 242 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
602. Id. at 234 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
603. Id. at 210-1I.
604. ld
605. Id. at 211 n.9.
606. See supra notes 411-21,567-81 and accompanying text.
607. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 217 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Schlesinger v.
Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975)).
608. Id.
609. See id. (quoting Ballard, 419 U.S. at 508).
610. Justice Stevens' inquiry was whether there was a "'legitimate basis for presuming that the
rule was actually intended to serve [the] interest' put forward by the Government as its justification."
Id. at 223 (Stevens, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426
U.S. 88, 103 (1976)).
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thinking about females, ' '6 1' and "something more than accident is necessary
to justify the disparate treatment of persons who have as strong a claim to
equal treatment as do similarly situated surviving spouses. ' 61z In other
words, although he apparently applied a different standard of review, he
seemed to agree with Justice Brennan that the classification was based on an
archaic stereotype.
Similarly, in Orr v. Orr, a six to three majority of the Court 613 struck
down a state's "alimony statutes which provide[d] that husbands, but not
wives, may be required to pay alimony upon divorce. 61 4 Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority, held that the gender classification could not be
justified as a type of affirmative action program "'designed"' either as a way
of "provid[ing] help for needy spouses, using sex as a proxy for need[,] ...
[or] compensating women for past discrimination during marriage, which
assertedly has left them unprepared to fend for themselves." 615 In reaching
this conclusion, he purported to apply intermediate scrutiny;6 16 he said the
issue was whether the classification was substantially related to the
otherwise important objectives of "assisting needy spouses" and
compensating women for the "disparity in economic condition" of the
genders.61 7
Although Justice Brennan talked in terms of the rhetoric of intermediate
scrutiny, his reasoning was to the effect that the classification was not even
reasonable or rational. His ultimate conclusion was that the classification
was unconstitutional because it was unnecessary and would "produce
perverse results. '618 He noted that the statute already provided for
"individualized hearings at which the parties' relative financial
circumstances are considered., 6 19 As a result, there was "no reason.., to use
611. Id.
612. Id.
613. The three dissenters dissented on judiciability grounds rather than on the merits. See Orr v.
Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 285-90 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting); Id. at 290-300 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
614. Id. at 270.
615. Id. at 280. Justice Brennan also rejected the argument that the classification could be justified
as a State "preference for an allocation of family responsibilities under which the wife play[ed] a
dependent role." Id. at 279. He "held that the 'old notio[n]' that 'generally it is the man's primary
responsibility to provide a home and its essentials,' [could] no longer justify a statute that
discriminates on the basis of gender." Id. at 279-80 (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 10
(1975)); see supra notes 340-48 and accompanying text.
616. Orr, 440 U.S. at 279.
617. id. at 280.
618. Id. at 282.
619. Id.at281.
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sex as a proxy for need... [and] [n]eedy males could be helped along with
needy females with little if any additional burden on the State." 620 Also,
"since individualized hearings [could] determine which women were in fact
discriminated against vis-A-vis their husbands, as well as which family units
defied the stereotype and left the husband dependent on the wife, [the
State's] alleged compensatory purpose [could have been] effectuated
without placing burdens solely on husbands. '62' Thus, he found that the
statutory classification suffered from the same infirmity as the one in
Wiesenfeld.622 It was "'gratuitous; without it, the statutory scheme would
have only provide[d] benefits to those men who [were] in fact similarly
situated to the women the statute aid[ed],' and the effort to help those
women would not in any way [have been] compromised., 623 Consequently,
it could not even pass the rational basis test since that was the standard the
Court appeared to apply in Wiesenfeld.624
Justice Brennan also found that as compared to a gender neutral statute,
the "gender classification actually produce[d] perverse results ... [in that it]
[gave] an advantage only to the financially secure wife whose husband [was]
in need., 625 He concluded that "[a] gender-based classification which, as
compared to a gender-neutral one, generates additional benefits only for
those it has no reason to prefer cannot survive equal protection scrutiny.,
626
Justice Brennan obviously thought that a classification that produced such
results was not even reasonable or rational.
In addition, in Mississippi University For Women v. Hogan, the issue
was the constitutionality of a female-only admissions policy that precluded
men from enrolling for credit at a state supported nursing school. 627 The
State defended the policy on the theory that "it compensate[d] for
discrimination against women and, therefore, constitute[d] educational
affirmative action." 628 Justice O'Connor, writing for the five Justice
majority, purported to apply intermediate scrutiny.629 She said the issue was
whether the classification was substantially related to important
governmental objectives, 630 and "a State can evoke a compensatory purpose
to justify an otherwise discriminatory classification only if members of the
620. Id.
621. Id. at281-82.
622. Id. at 282.
623. Id. at 282 (citation omitted) (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975)).
624. See supra notes 567-81 and accompanying text.
625. Orr, 440 U.S. at 282.
626. Id. at 282-83.
627. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 719 (1982).
628. Id. at 727.
629. See id at 723-31.
630. Id. at 724.
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gender benefited by the classification actually suffer a disadvantage related
to the classification. 631 She found that the State made "no showing that
women lacked opportunities to obtain training in the field of nursing or to
attain positions of leadership in that field when the ... School of Nursing
opened its door or that women currently are deprived of such
opportunities., 63 ' Thus, she held that the classification was unconstitutional
because "although the State recited a 'benign, compensatory purpose,' it
failed to establish that the alleged objective [was] the actual purpose
underlying the discriminatory classification, 633 and had "fallen far short of
establishing the 'exceedingly persuasive justification' needed to sustain the
gender-based classification.
' 634
Although Justice O'Connor purported to apply intermediate scrutiny,
her opinion is perfectly consistent with rational basis review as applied in
Schlesinger v. Ballard, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, Frontiero v. Richardson,
and Reed v. Reed, all of which she in fact cited.635 She did not "accept at face
value assertions ' ' 636 of a compensatory purpose; indeed, she cited Wiesenfeld
for the proposition that "'the mere recitation of a benign, compensatory
purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry into
the actual purposes.' 637 Consistent with Wiesenfeld, she engaged in a
"searching analysis '638 of the "'statutory scheme.' ' 639 Citing United States
government statistics, she found that "the year before the School of
Nursing's first class enrolled, women earned 94 percent of the nursing
baccalaureate degrees conferred in Mississippi and 98.6 percent of the
degrees earned nationwide"'640 and that ten years later, "women received
more than 94 percent of the baccalaureate degrees conferred nationwide." 64'
Although she did not say it as such, Justice O'Connor obviously thought
that, based on these statistics, it was not even conceivable or plausible that
631. Id. at 728.
632. Id. at 729.
633. Id. at 730.
634. Id. at 731.
635. Id. at 728 (citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard,
419 U.S. 498 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971)).
636. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 648 n.16.
637. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 728 (quoting Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 648).
638. Id. at 728.
639. Id. at 728 (quoting Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 648).
640. Id. at 729.
641. Id. at 729 n.14.
the exclusion of men was designed to compensate women for discrimination
in the field of nursing.642
Similarly, in United States v. Virginia, Justice Ginsburg, writing for six
members of the Court, rejected the State's attempt to justify the exclusion of
women from Virginia Military Institute, inter alia, on the theory that it was a
benign classification designed to provide "'important educational benefits"'
that "contribute[d] to 'diversity in educational approaches.' ' 643 Although
Justice Ginsburg purported to apply intermediate scrutiny to the case
generally, 6M 4 her holding on this part of the case is consistent with rational
basis review. Like Justice O'Connor in Hogan,645 Justice Ginsburg did not
"accept at face value assertions ''646 of a compensatory purpose. She cited
Wiesenfeld, which appeared to apply rational basis review,647 and Goldfarb,
which had relied on Wiesenfeld,648 for the propositions that "'benign'
642. Justice O'Connor also held that even if the exclusion of males had a compensatory purpose,
the classification would still be unconstitutional because it was not "substantially and directly related
to" that purpose. id. at 730. However, here too, her conclusion did not depend on intermediate
scrutiny as the verbalization of the standard of review. She noted that MUW permitted males to
"audit [and] to participate fully in classes.., and ... take part in continuing education courses
offered by the School of Nursing, in which regular nursing students also (could] enroll." Id. at 731.
She also pointed out that "[t]he uncontroverted record reveal[ed] that admitting men to nursing
classes [did] not affect teaching style, that the presence of men in the classroom would not affect the
performance of the female nursing students, and that men in coeducational nursing schools [did] not
dominate the classroom." Id. (citations omitted). Thus, "the record... [was] flatly inconsistent with
the claim that excluding men from the School of Nursing [was] necessary to reach any of MUW's
educational goals." Id. In effect, she concluded that exclusion of men was not even reasonably or
rationally related to the School's goals. Justice O'Connor also found that "[r]ather than compensate
for discriminatory barriers faced by women, MUW's policy ... tend[ed] to perpetuate the
stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman's job." Id. at 729. It "lend[ed] credibility to the
old view that women, not men, should become nurses, and [made] the assumption that nursing is a
field for women a self-fulfilling prophecy." Id. at 730. On this view of the underlying facts, the
classification would also be unconstitutional under the rational basis test as applied in cases such as
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975), which Justice O'Connor in fact cited. Id. at 730. For a
discussion of Stanton, see supra notes 340-48 and accompanying text.
Justice Powell, joined by Justice Rehnquist, explicitly applied the rational basis test. See Hogan,
458 U.S. at 742 (Powell, J., dissenting). However, he thought that the classification was
constitutional even under intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 743 (Powell, J., dissenting). On the fit issue,
he thought that the fact that men could audit classes did not mean that the statute's means were not
"sufficiently related" to its ends. Id. at 744 n.17 (Powell, J., dissenting). He noted that "[o]n
average ... men [had] audited 14 courses a year ... [out of] 913 courses offered." Id. In his view,
"[t]his deviation from a perfect relationship between means and ends [was] insubstantial." Id. In
separate opinions, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun agreed with much of Justice Powell's
opinion. Id. at 733 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 733-34 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
643. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 535 (1996) (quoting Brief for Cross-Petitioners at
20, 25, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)). For a discussion of the government's other
argument in the case, see supra notes 372-97 and accompanying text.
644. See id at 531-34.
645. See supra notes 636-37 and accompanying text.
646. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n.16 (1975).
647. See supra notes 567-81 and accompanying text.
648. See supra notes 596-612 and accompanying text.
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justifications proffered in defense of categorical exclusions will not be
accepted automatically; a tenable justification must describe actual state
purposes, not rationalizations for actions in fact differently grounded, ''649 and
that "'mere recitation of a benign [or] compensatory purpose' does not block
'inquiry into actual purposes' of government maintained gender-based
classifications. 65° She then proceeded to engage in "an examination of the
legislative scheme and its history. 65' She found that "[n]either recent nor
distant history [bore] out Virginia's alleged pursuit of diversity through
single-sex educational options '652 or, otherwise, that "VMI was established,
or has been maintained, with a view to diversifying, by its categorical
exclusion of women, educational opportunities. .. Obviously, Justice
Ginsburg did not think that the State's assertion was even plausible.654
Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg emphasized that the case involved "an
educational opportunity recognized ... as 'unique.' ' 655 She said that "[a]
purpose genuinely to advance an array of educational options ... [was] not
served by VMI's historic and constant plan - a plan to 'affor[d] a unique
educational benefit only to males.' 656 She concluded that "[h]owever
649. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 535-36.
650. Id. at 536 (quoting Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 648).
651. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 648 n.16.
652. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 536.
653. Id. at 535. She found that "the historical record indicate[d]" that "the current absence of
public single-sex higher education for women... [was] deliberate ... : First, protection of women
against higher education; next, schools for women far from equal in resources and stature to schools
for men; finally, conversion of the separate schools to coeducation." Id. at 538.
Furthermore, she noted that the court of appeals found only one "'explicit... [statement] ... in
which the Commonwealth [had] expressed itself with respect to gender distinctions."' Id. at 539
(quoting United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 899 (4th Cir. 1992), aff'd, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)).
She also noted that after Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, "VMI ... reexamine[d] its
male-only admission policy," but she could not "extract from that effort any.., policy evenhandedly
to advance diverse educational options." Id.
In a separate concurring opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed with the majority "that there [was]
scant evidence in the record that ... the real reason that Virginia decided to maintain VMI as men
only" was the purpose of "diversity in education." Id. at 562 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). However,
in this regard, he "would consider only evidence that postdate[d] [the Court's) decision in Hogan,
and would draw no negative inferences from the Commonwealth's actions before that time."Id.
654. But see id. at 578 (Scalia, J., dissenting). "There [could] be no serious dispute that... single-
sex education and a distinctive educational method 'represent[ed] legitimate contributions to
diversity in the Virginia higher educational system."' Id. (quoting United States v. Virginia, 766 F.
Supp. 1407, 1413 (W. D. Va. 1991), vacated, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), aff'd, 518 U.S. 515
(1996)).
655. Id. at 533 n.7.
656. Id. at 539-40 (alteration in original) (quoting Virginia, 976 F.2d at 899). Chief Justice
Rehnquist agreed that "[e]ven if diversity in educational opportunity were the Commonwealth's
'liberally' this plan serve[d] the Commonwealth's sons, it [made] no
provision whatever for her daughters. That is not equal protection." '657 This
assertion has nothing to do with the verbalization of the standard of review
as intermediate scrutiny. Since Justice Ginsburg thought that providing "'a
unique educational benefit only to males' 658 was "not equal protection," she
presumably also thought it was not even constitutionally legitimate for
purposes of rational basis review.659
4. Fit Between Means and Ends
Even if a classification has a constitutionally permissible purpose, the
means still must be closely enough related to the ends so as to justify the
distinction. However, even the gender cases in which the fit between the
means and ends was at issue are explainable on rational basis grounds. For
example, in Craig v. Boren,660 the issue was the constitutionality of a state
actual objective, the Commonwealth's position would still be problematic ... [since] the diversity
benefited only one sex; there was single-sex public education available for men at VMI, but no
corresponding single-sex public education available for women." Id. at 562 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring). However, he thought that the State "might well have avoided an equal protection
violation" if it had "made a genuine effort to devote comparable public resources to a facility for
women, and followed through on such a plan." Id. at 563 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). He pointed
out that the State treated the four all female private schools that existed in the state "exactly as all
other private schools [were] treated, which include[d] the provision of tuition-assistance grants to...
residents." Id. at 564 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). He reasoned that "[h]ad the Commonwealth
provided the kind of support for the private women's schools that it provide[d] for VMI, this may
have been a very different case." Id.
657. Id. at 540. Justice Ginsburg also held that the creation of a state sponsored "parallel program"
for women at a private liberal arts school for women was not an adequate remedy for "[tihe
constitutional violation... [of] the categorical exclusion of women from an extraordinary
educational opportunity afforded men." Id. at 547; See also id. at 548-51. She noted that "[a]
remedial decree.., must closely fit the constitutional violation; it must be shaped to place persons
unconstitutionally denied an opportunity or advantage in 'the position they would have occupied in
the absence of [discrimination]."' Id. at 547 (alteration in original) (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433
U.S. 267, 280 (1977)). The proposed parallel program failed this test because it was "different in
kind from VMI and unequal in tangible and intangible facilities." Id.
Chief Justice Rehnquist thought that the constitutional violation was "not the 'exclusion of
women' ... but the maintenance of an all-men school without providing any - much less a
comparable - institution for women." Id. at 565 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Consequently, he
thought that "[a]n adequate remedy ... might be a demonstration by Virginia that its interest in
educating men in a single-sex environment is matched by its interest in educating women in a single-
sex institution." Id. In his view, "[i]t would [have been] a sufficient remedy... if the two institutions
offered the same quality of education and were of the same overall caliber." Id. Nonetheless, he
agreed that the proposed parallel program "fail[ed] as a remedy, because it [was] distinctly inferior
to the existing men's institution and [would] continue to be for the foreseeable future." Id. at 566.
658. Id. at 540 (quoting Virginia, 976 F.2d at 899).
659. Cf Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (applying rational basis review). ("A law
declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek
aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense.")
660. For other gender cases in which the fit between the means and ends was at issue, and that are
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statutory scheme that prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the age
of twenty-one, but only prohibited the sale of such beer to females under the
age of eighteen.66' The purported objective of the classification was traffic
safety.662 Justice Brennan, writing for the court, insisted that in order for
gender classifications to be upheld they "must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives., 663 Still, at this time in the evolution of the standard, five
members of the Court were not yet ready to unequivocally endorse
intermediate scrutiny as the standard. 664 Nonetheless, the Court, seven to
two, had little trouble in finding that the classification amounted to
unconstitutional gender discrimination.665
A majority of the Court either explicitly or implicitly found that the
classification was not reasonable or rational.666 Justice Stewart thought that
explainable on rational basis grounds, see Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (discussed supra notes
156-85 and accompanying text, infra notes 729-62 and accompanying text); United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (discussed supra notes 372-97 and accompanying text); JE.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. TB., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (discussed supra notes 362-71 and accompanying text);
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 719 (1982) (discussed supra note 642);
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (discussed supra notes 524-39 and accompanying text);
Michael M v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 467 (1981) (plurality opinion) (discussed supra notes 470-
502 and accompanying text); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) (discussed supra notes
353-61 and accompanying text); Wengler v. Druggist Mutual Insurance Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980)
(discussed supra notes 440-69 and accompanying text); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979)
(discussed infra notes 679-704 and accompanying text); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979)
(discussed infra notes 705-28 and accompanying text); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636
(1975) (discussed supra notes 411-21 and accompanying text); and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973) (discussed supra notes 398-417 and accompanying text).
661. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 191-92 (1976).
662. Id. at 199. Justice Brennan accepted this objective for purpose of analysis, "leaving for
another day consideration of whether the statement of the State's Assistant Attorney General should
suffice to inform this Court of the legislature's objectives, or whether the Court must determine if
the litigant simply is selecting a convenient, but false, post hoc rationalization." Id. at 200 n.7
(emphasis omitted).
663. Id. at 197.
664. Two justices joined Justice Brennan's opinion but expressed reservations concerning the
appropriate standard of review. See id. at 210-11 (Powell, J., concurring); Id. at 211-14 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). See also infra notes 668-69 and accompanying text, infra note 675. Three other justices
applied rational basis review. See id. at 214-15 (Stewart, J., concurring); Id. at 215-17 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); Id. at 217-28 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
665. Id. at 210. Id. at 210-11 (Powell, J., concurring); Id. at 214 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Id. at
214-15 (Stewart, J., concurring).
666. Cf Hlavac, supra note 18, at 1376 (asserting that, in Craig:
the Court did not need to apply.., intermediate scrutiny to strike down the respective
gender-classification schemes. It could have applied the rational-basis test and concluded
that the means chosen were not rationally related to the government objectives because
the means themselves were based on archaic and overbroad generalizations).
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the distinction evidenced "total irrationality. '667  Justice Powell, also
apparently applying rational basis, 668 concluded that the distinction did "not
bear a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation., 669 Even
Justice Brennan, in effect held that the classification was not reasonable or
rational.670 His ultimate conclusion was that the government's statistical
evidence offered to justify the gender distinction had an "unduly tenuous 671
relationship to the objective of traffic safety.672 Although it has been said
that under rational basis review a classification "will be sustained ... even
if... the rationale for it seems tenuous," 673 it has also been said that a
classification will only be upheld under rational basis review if its
"relationship ... to its goal is not so attenuated as to render the distinction
arbitrary or irrational., 674 Since Justice Brennan characterized the means-
ends relationship as not only tenuous, but "unduly tenuous," he presumably
thought that the case fell within the latter category rather than the former.675
But see Craig, 429 U.S. at 217 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (asserting that eight members of the Court
did not believe that the means were irrational).
667. Craig, 429 U.S. at 215 (Stewart, J., concurring).
668. Although Justice Powell joined the Court's opinion, he found it "unnecessary" to read Reed
v. Reed "as broadly as some of the Court's language [might] imply." Id. at 210 (Powell, J.,
concurring) However, he noted that "the relatively deferential 'rational basis' standard of review
normally applied takes on a sharper focus" when applied to gender classifications. Id. at 210-11 n.*.
669. Id. at 211 (Powell, J., concurring).
670. See id. at 200-04.
671. Id. at 202.
672. Id. 199-204.
673. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
674. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11 (1992).
675. Craig, 429 U.S. at 202. Justice Stevens filed a separate concurring opinion, but he did not
clearly apply any particular standard of review. He said that he joined the Court's opinion, but he
seemed to criticize the application of different standards of review in equal protection cases. See id.
at 211-12 (Stevens, J., concurring). Nonetheless, he too found the classification "objectionable
because it [was] based on an accident of birth, because it [was] a mere remnant of the ... tradition of
discriminating against males in this age bracket, and because, to the extent it reflect[ed] any physical
difference between males and females, it [was] actually perverse." Id. at 212-13 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). As to the latter, he pointed out that since "males are generally heavier than females,
they have a greater capacity to consume alcohol without impairing their driving ability." Id. at 213
n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens also found it "difficult to believe that the statute was
actually intended to cope with the problem of traffic safety, since it ha[d] only a minimal effect on
access to a not very intoxicating beverage and [did] not prohibit its consumption." Id. at 213
(Stevens, J., concurring). He concluded that while the statutory scheme was not "totally irrational,"
the Government's traffic safety rationale did not "make an otherwise offensive classification
acceptable." Id. The two dissenters, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, applying rational
basis review, concluded that the statutory distinction was constitutional. Id. at 215-17 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); Id. at 217-18, (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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5. Nguyen Revisited: Are the Genders Similarly Situated with Respect to
Nonmarital Children?
Nguyen is one of three cases in which the Court has been closely divided
on the constitutionality of statutes that distinguish between the genders with
respect to their nonmarital children.676 Although a majority of the Court in
each of these cases purported to apply intermediate scrutiny, the
verbalization of that standard of review had little to do with the outcomes.
For the most part, the underlying question in the cases was whether the
genders were similarly situated with respect to the classification at issue. In
each of the cases, the Justices engaged in a reasoned analysis of the
underlying facts and policies. Those Justices who found the classifications to
be based on "'overbroad generalizations' 677 voted to strike them down;
those who found them to be based on the fact that "men and women are not
similarly situated' 678 voted to uphold them. Consequently, the results in the
cases are perfectly consistent with rational basis review.
Thus, in Caban v. Mohammed, the issue was the constitutionality of a
state statute that required the consent of the mother, but not the father, as a
condition for the adoption of children born out of wedlock.679 As a result, a
mother could prevent the adoption of her out-of-wedlock child by refusing to
consent.680 However, a father could prevent the adoption of such a child
"only by showing that the best interests of the child would not permit the
child's adoption by the petitioning couple. 68' Explicitly applying
intermediate scrutiny,682 Justice Powell, writing for a five to four majority,
found the statute unconstitutional.683 However, his reasoning did not depend
on the application of that standard. His basic policy concern was that the
classification "discriminate[d] against unwed fathers even when their
identity [was] known and they ha[d] manifested a significant paternal
interest in the child. 684 It treated "unwed fathers as being invariably less
qualified and entitled than mothers to exercise a concerned judgment as to
676. The other two cases are Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979), and Caban v. Mohammed,
441 U.S. 350 (1979).
677. Caban, 441 U.S. at 394 (quoting Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 211 (1977)).
678. Parham, 441 U.S. at 354.
679. Caban, 441 U.S. at 385.
680. Id. at 385-86.
681. Id. at 387.
682. Id. at 388.
683. Id. at 394.
684. Id.
the fate of their children. 685 It also "both exclude[d] some loving fathers
from full participation in the decision whether their children [would] be
adopted and, at the same time, enable[d] some alienated mothers arbitrarily
to cut off the paternal rights of fathers." 686 His ultimate conclusion, citing
Califano v. Goldfarb and Stanton v. Stanton, was that the statute was
"another example of 'overbroad generalizations' in gender-based
classifications., 687 Consequently, on this view of the underlying facts and
policies, the classification was unconstitutional under the rational basis
test. 688 Indeed, he expressly said, citing Reed v. Reed, that "under the
relevant cases applying the Equal Protection Clause it must be shown that
the distinction is structured reasonably to further ... [its] ends., 68 9
685. Id.
686. Id.
687. Id. (quoting Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 211 (1977); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7,
14-15 (1975)). Justice Powell rejected the argument that the classification could be justified on the
ground that "'a natural mother, absent special circumstances, bears a closer relationship with her
child ... than a father does."' Id. at 388 (quoting Tr. of oral arg. at 41, Caban v. Mohammed, 441
U.S. 380 (1979)). In his view, "maternal and paternal roles are not invariably different in
importance." Id. at 389. He reasoned that "[e]ven if unwed mothers as a class were closer than
unwed fathers to their newborn infants, this generalization concerning parent-child relations would
become less acceptable as a basis for legislative distinctions as the age of the child increased." Id. He
noted that in the case, the unmarried mother and father lived together with their children "as a
natural family for several years" and both "participated" in their "care and support." Id. Therefore,
he found "no reason to believe that the ... children - aged 4 and 6 at the time of the adoption
proceedings - had a relationship with their mother unrivaled by the affection and concern of their
father." Id. Consequently, he "reject[ed] ... the claim that the broad, gender-based distinction...
[was] required by any universal difference between maternal and paternal relations at every phase of
a child's development." Id.
Justice Powell also rejected the argument "that the distinction between unwed fathers and unwed
mothers ... [was] substantially related to the State's interest in promoting the adoption of
illegitimate children." Id. He conceded that "[t]he State's interest in providing for the well-being of
illegitimate children [was] an important one," id. at 391, but he concluded that there had been "no
showing" that the means were substantially related to this end. Id. at 393. His reasoning, however,
was that there was no legitimate difference between the genders in this regard. He said that "[i]t may
be that, given the opportunity, some unwed fathers would prevent the adoption of their illegitimate
children." Id. at 391. However, "[t]his impediment to adoption [was] the result of a natural parental
interest shared by both genders alike; it [was] not a manifestation of any profound difference
between the affectation and concern of mothers and fathers for their children." Id. at 391-92. He also
noted that "[n]either the State nor the appellees [had] argued that unwed fathers are more likely to
object to the adoption of their children than are unwed mothers; nor [was] there any self-evident
reason why as a class they would be." Id. at 392. He also thought that "[e]ven if the special
difficulties attendant upon locating and identifying unwed fathers at birth would justify a legislative
distinction between mothers and fathers of newborns, these difficulties need not persist past
infancy." Id. For him, "[w]hen the adoption of an older child [was] sought, the State's interest in
proceeding with adoption cases [could] be protected by means that [did] not draw such an inflexible
gender-based distinction . I..." Id. In his view, "where the father has established a substantial
relationship with the child and has admitted his paternity, a State should have no difficulty in
identifying the father even of children born out of wedlock." Id at 393.
688. See source cited supra note 360.
689. Caban, 441 U.S. at 391.
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Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist,
dissenting,690 viewed the case differently. He did not purport to apply
intermediate scrutiny or any other standard of review as such. 69 1 Instead, he
asked the fundamental question of whether there were "differences between"
the genders that would "provide a justification for treating them
differently. 692 Unlike Justice Powell, he concluded that the statute was
constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause because it was based on
real differences between men and women693 with respect to "its most
frequent" 694 and "normal application,, 695 concerning the adoption of "infants
or very young children. 696 He thought it was "perfectly obvious that at the
time and immediately after a child is born out of wedlock, differences
between men and women justify some differential treatment of the mother
and father in the adoption process., 697 These differences include the fact that
"the mother carries the child" 698 and "only the mother knows who sired the
child, and it will often be within her power to withhold that fact, and even
the fact of her pregnancy, from that person. '699 Furthermore, she could
marry a different person and thus legitimatize the child without the father
ever knowing of "his 'rights.' 700 In addition, after birth, "the mother and
child are together; the mother's identity is known with certainty."
70
'
However, the "father... may or may not be present; his identity may be
unknown to the world and may even be uncertain to the mother., 70 2 Thus, it
is "probable that the mother, and not the father or both parents, will have
690. Id. at 401-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart also filed a separate dissenting opinion,
but he did not expressly apply intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 394-401 (Stewart, J., dissenting). He did
note that "gender-based statutory classifications deserve careful constitutional examination because
they may reflect or operate to perpetuate mythical or stereotyped assumptions about the proper roles
and the relative capabilities of men and women that are unrelated to any inherent differences
between the sexes." Id. at 398 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, "[flor substantially the reasons
expressed by ... Justice Stevens" he concluded that the gender classification at issue did not violate
equal protection. Id. at 400 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
691. See id. at 401-14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
692. Id. at 403 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
693. Id. at 404 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
694. Id. at 410 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
695. Id. at 413 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
696. Id. at 404 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
697. Id. at 407 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
698. Id. at 404 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
699. Id. at 405 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
700. Id.
701. Id.
702. Id.
custody of the newbom infant. 70 3 Accordingly "these differences justify a
rule that gives the mother of the newborn infant the exclusive right to
consent to its. adoption. '70 4 Obviously, Justice Stevens thought that the
gender classification was reasonable, rational, and legitimate.
On the other hand, in Parham v. Hughes, a closely divided Court upheld
a state statute that permitted the mother of an illegitimate child to bring an
action for the wrongful death of the child, but that precluded the father from
bringing such an action unless there was no mother and he had previously
legitimated the child.70 5 The statute was challenged by the father of an
illegitimate child who, along with the mother, was killed in an automobile
accident.70 6 The father had not legitimated the child, as he could have easily
done under state law.707 However, he had signed the birth certificate and did
contribute to the child's support.70 8 In addition, he had visited the child
regularly and the child had taken his name.70 9 The state court held that the
statute was constitutional.710 A five to four majority of the Court affirmed.7 1
703. Id.
704. Id. at 407 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also argued that the statutory distinction
should not necessarily be held unconstitutional, even if its application appeared to be arbitrary in the
instant case involving a relatively rare "adoption of an older child against the wishes of a natural
father who previously [had] participated in the rearing of the child and who admit[ed] paternity." Id.
at 409 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He reasoned that:
[t]he mere fact that an otherwise valid general classification appears arbitrary in an
isolated case is not a sufficient reason for invalidating the entire rule ... [nor. ... is it a
sufficient reason for concluding that the application of a valid rule in a hard case
constitutes a violation of equal protection principles.
Id. at 411-12 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In such cases, the Court "should presume that the law is
entirely valid and require the challenger to demonstrate that its unjust applications are sufficiently
numerous and serious to render it invalid." Id. at 410 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This the father had
failed to do. Id. On the other hand, the state "[c]ourt of [a]ppeals [had] previously concluded that the
subclass [was] small and its disadvantage insignificant by comparison to the benefits of the rule." Id.
However, he doubted that the statute was arbitrary even with respect to the "exceptional
circumstances" of the instant case given the gender-neutral alternatives. Id. at 411 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). He noted that "[i]f both [parents] [were] given a veto, as the Court require[d], neither
[could] adopt and the children [would] remain illegitimate." Id. On the other hand, "[i]f, instead of a
gender-based distinction, the veto were given to the parent having custody of the child, the mother
would prevail just as she did in the state court." Id. In any event, his ultimate conclusion was that
because "in the more common adoption situations, the mother will be the more, and often the only,
responsible parent, and ... a paternal consent requirement [would] constitute a hindrance to the
adoption process," the statutory created gender distinction was justified even as applied to this case.
Id. at 413 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
705. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 348-49 (1979).
706. Id. at 349.
707. Id.
708. Id.
709. Id.
710. Id. at 350.
711. Id. at 359.
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Although five members of the Court explicitly purported to apply
intermediate scrutiny,712 Justice Stewart, writing for a four Justice plurality,
expressly applied the rational basis test."' He held that the classification was
constitutional because it was based on the fact that the genders were "not
similarly situated., 714 He noted that the Court had upheld classifications
"[i]n cases where men and women [were] not similarly situated... and a
statutory classification [was] realistically based upon the differences in their
situations. 71 5 He thought that this was such a case since "[u]nlike the
mother of an illegitimate child whose identity will rarely be in doubt, the
identity of the father will frequently be unknown." 716 Thus, the statute did
not "invidiously discriminate against the . . . [father] simply because he is of
the male sex. ' 7 17 Rather, it "distinguishe[d] between fathers who have
legitimated their children and those who have not., 718 In his view, "[s]uch a
classification [was] quite unlike those condemned in... [gender] cases
which were premised upon overbroad generalizations and excluded all
members of one sex even though they were similarly situated with members
of the other sex. ' 71 9 He was convinced that the classification was rationally
related to the State's permissible "interest in avoiding fraudulent claims of
paternity in order to maintain a fair and orderly system of... property
disposition.., in the context of actions for wrongful death., 720 He reasoned
that "[i]f paternity has not been established before the commencement of a
wrongful-death action, a defendant may be faced with the possibility of
multiple lawsuits by individuals all claiming to be the father of the deceased
child., 72 1 Consequently, "[s]uch uncertainty would make it difficult if not
impossible for a defendant to settle a wrongful-death action in many cases,
since there would always exist the risk of a subsequent suit by another
person claiming to be the father.
7 2 2
712. See infra notes 723-28 and accompanying text.
713. Parham, 441 U.S. at 357.
714. Id. at 355.
715. Id. at 354.
716. Id. at 355.
717. Id.
718. Id. at 356.
719. Id. at 356-57.
720. Id. at 357.
721. Id.
722. Id. Furthermore, since the statute requiring the father to establish his paternity before the fact
had a rational basis, it was "constitutionally irrelevant," id. at 358, that there was no doubt in the
case that the appellant was the father. See id. at 358.
265
In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell, who provided the fifth vote for
upholding the statute, purported to apply intermediate scrutiny.7 3 However,
his rationale was similar to that of Justice Stewart, who, of course, applied
rational basis review. He thought that the statute was constitutional7 24
because it was "substantially related to achievement of the important state
objective of avoiding difficult problems in proving paternity after the death
of an illegitimate child. 725 Justice White, writing for the four dissenters,726
also purported to apply intermediate scrutiny.727 Nonetheless, he seemed to
think that the statutory means were not even reasonably or rationally related
to any of their asserted ends.728
723. Id. at 359 (Powell, J., concurring).
724. Id. at 360-61 (Powell, J., concurring).
725. Id. at 359-60 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell noted that according to the statutory
scheme, "a father [could] legitimate his child simply by filing a petition in state court identifying the
child and its mother and requesting an order of legitimation," which the mother [could] "either
support or rebut." Id. at 360 (Powell, J., concurring). In his view, this "marginally greater burden
placed on fathers" was justified "by the marked difference between proving paternity and proving
matemity." Id.
726. Id. at 361-68 (White, J., dissenting).
727. Id. at 362 (White, J., dissenting).
728. Justice White rejected the argument made by the state supreme court that the classification
was justified as a way of "'promoting a legitimate family unit' and 'setting a standard of morality."
Id. (quoting Hughes v. Parham, 243 S.E.2d 867, 869-70 (Ga. 1978), aff 441 U.S. 347 (1979)). He
seemed to think that this argument was not even rational. He said "it [was] untenable to conclude
that denying parents a right to recover when their illegitimate children die [would] further the
asserted state interests." Id. at 363 (White, J., dissenting).
He also rejected another argument made by the state supreme court that the statutory classification
could be justified on the ground that "'more often than not the father of an illegitimate child who has
elected neither to marry the mother nor to legitimate the child pursuant to proper legal proceedings
suffers no real loss from the child's wrongful death."' ld. at 366 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting
Parham, 243 S.E.2d at 70). He seemed to think that this argument too was irrational. He said that
"such a legislative conception about fathers of illegitimate children [was] an unacceptable basis for a
blanket discrimination against all such fathers." Id. This was especially true in this case where the
father "signed his child's birth certificate, continuously contributed to the child's financial support,
and maintained daily contact with him." Id. at 367 (White, J., dissenting). He concluded that a state
"may not categorically eliminate on the basis of sex any recovery by those parents it deems
uninjured or undeserving." Id. at 368 (White, J., dissenting).
Finally, Justice White also rejected the argument, accepted by the majority, that the classification
was justified as a way of "'forestalling potential problems of proof of paternity."' Id. at 364 (White,
J., dissenting) (quoting Parham, 243 S.E.2d at 869). He seemed to think that this rationale also was
neither reasonable nor legitimate. He said that "the State has no... interest in protecting a tortfeasor
from having his liability litigated and determined in the usual way." Id. He noted that "[t]here is
always the possibility of spurious claims in tort litigation, and the plaintiff will have the burden of
proof if his parenthood is challenged." Id. at 364-65 (White, J., dissenting). Consequently, he
concluded that:
[i]t denigrates the judicial process, as well as the interest in foreclosing gender-based
discriminations, to hold that the possibility of erroneous determinations of paternity in an
unknown number of cases, likely to be few, is sufficient reason to forbid all natural,
unmarried fathers who have not legitimated their children from seeking to prove their
parenthood and recovering in damages for the tort that has been committed.
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Nguyen also is perfectly consistent with rational basis review. Recall
that, in that case, the Court, five to four, upheld a congressional statute that
placed greater requirements on unwed citizen fathers than on unwed citizen
mothers, with respect to conferring United States citizenship on their
offspring bom outside the United States and its possessions, when the other
parent was an alien. 7 9 As noted earlier, all of the Justices purported to apply
intermediate scrutiny, but disagreed as to its application. 730 They disagreed
on such issues as whether the asserted purposes for the classification
(assuring that a biological parent-child relationship exists and ensuring the
opportunity for a parent-child relationship to develop) were the actual
purposes;73' even if they were the actual purposes, whether they were
important enough to justify the distinction;732 whether the means employed
were substantially related to the ends;733 and whether the classification was
based on a stereotype that could have been avoided by the use of gender
neutral alternatives, as well as the extent to which the classification could be
justified based on administrative convenience.734
Although both the majority and the dissent argued the case in the
framework of intermediate scrutiny, both opinions are explainable on
rational basis grounds. What really was at issue was a dispute as to the
underlying doctrines, facts, and policies. Both opinions engaged in a
reasoned analysis, but reached different conclusions as to the
constitutionality of the classification. As the majority saw it, the statutory
classification requiring unwed fathers, but not unwed mothers, to take
certain steps prior to the child's eighteenth birthday in order to confer
citizenship on the child was not based on a stereotype.735 It was "not marked
by misconception and prejudice, nor [did] it show disrespect for either
class. 736 Instead, it was based on "real... [biological] difference[s]
Id. at 365 (White, J., dissenting). He went on to assert that "[m]uch the same is true of the rather
lame suggestion that keeping fathers such as this appellant out of court will protect wrongdoers and
their insurance companies from multiple recoveries." Id. at 365-66 (White, J., dissenting). He
thought that the "claimed danger [was] but one of many potential hazards in personal injury
litigation, and it [was] very doubtful that it would be exacerbated if the... statute in this case were
stricken down." Id. at 366 (White, J., dissenting).
729. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 59-60 (2001).
730. Id. at 60-61, 74-75.
731. See supra notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
732. See supra notes 144-55 and accompanying text.
733. See supra notes 156-85 and accompanying text.
734. See supra notes 186-220 and accompanying text.
735. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 68.
736. Id. at 73.
between men and women in relation to the birth process., 737 The "mother
must be present at birth but the father need not be. 738 Consequently, the
statutory requirements "substantially ' 739 served the interests of assuring
biological fatherhood, and assuring the father and the child "have some
demonstrated opportunity or potential to develop ... a relationship. 74°
Thus, the majority thought that the classification was "reasonable, ' 741
"sensible, ' 742 "unobjectionable, '743 "unremarkable," 7, 44 and "unsurprising. 7 45
Clearly, as Justice O'Connor suggested,746 the majority thought that the
statutory classification was reasonably and rationally related to legitimate
governmental interests.
Furthermore, although she would no doubt vehemently deny it, even
Justice O'Connor's opinion is consistent with rational basis review. With
respect to the first asserted interest, assuring a biological relationship, she
found "[t]he gravest defect ... [to be] the insufficiency of the fit between...
[the] discriminatory means and the asserted end. 747 However, her principal
substantive objection to the classification was that it was unnecessary. She
noted that the statute on its face required the father to establish paternity by
"clear and convincing evidence. 748 Thus, she found it difficult to see what
the additional requirements of "legitimation, an acknowledgment of
paternity in writing under oath, or an adjudication of paternity before the
child reaches the age of [eighteen] ... accomplishe[d] ... that [the
requirement of clear and convincing evidence] [did] not achieve on its
own." 749 This was so at least in part because DNA testing could provide
"virtual certainty of a biological link that... [would] negate[] the
evidentiary significance of the passage of time.
750
On this view of the underlying facts and policies, the classification
would be unconstitutional under Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld. In that case, the
Court, apparently applying the rational basis test,75' struck down the
classification at issue in part on the ground that it was "gratuitous; without it,
737. Id.
738. Id.
739. Id. at 64.
740. Id. at 64-65.
741. Id. at 63, 66.
742. Id. at 64.
743. Id. at 67.
744. Id. at 66.
745. Id. at 68.
746. See id. at 74-78, 82 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
747. Id. at 80 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
748. Id.
749. Id.
750. Id.
751. See supra notes 567-81 and accompanying text.
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the statutory scheme would only provide benefits to those men who [were]
in fact similarly situated to the women the statute aid[ed]. '7 52 Similarly, from
Justice O'Connor's perspective, the additional statutory requirements were
gratuitous. Without them, only unwed fathers who could prove paternity by
clear and convincing evidence could receive the same benefits as unwed
mothers with respect to conferring citizenship on their alien offspring.
Consequently, the classification could not survive rational basis review.
Justice O'Connor also found fault with the second asserted interest,
ensuring the opportunity for a parent-child relationship to develop. She
questioned whether that interest was Congress' actual purpose;753 even if it
was, whether it was important enough to qualify as an "'important'
governmental interest apart from the existence of an actual relationship;"75
and whether, in any event, the means were substantially related to the
asserted ends.755 However, after a reasoned analysis, she also found that "the
idea that a mother's presence at birth supplies adequate assurance of an
opportunity to develop a relationship while a father's presence at birth does
not would appear to rest only on an overbroad sex-based generalization.' 756
In her view, "[t]here is no reason, other than stereotype, to say that fathers
who are present at birth lack an opportunity for a relationship on similar
terms. 757 As she saw it, "the statute on its face accord[ed] different
treatment to a mother who is by nature present at birth and a father who is by
choice present at birth even though those two individuals are similarly
situated with respect to the 'opportunity' for a relationship." '758 Hence, the
classification found "support not in biological differences but instead in a
stereotype - i.e., 'the generalization that mothers are significantly more
likely than fathers ... to develop caring relationships with their
children."'75 9 Furthermore, she found the classification to be "paradigmatic
752. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975).
753. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 83-84 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
754. Id. at 84 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
755. Id. at 85-91 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
756. Id. at 86 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In engaging in an independent reasoned analysis, even
Justice O'Connor seemed to ignore her own intermediate scrutiny dictum. She said that "the burden
is [not] on the challenger of the classification to prove legislative reliance on such [overbroad]
generalizations." Id. at 90 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Instead, "[t]he burden of proving that the use
of a sex-based classification substantially relates to the achievement of an important governmental
interest remains unmistakably and entirely with the classification's defender." Id. at 91 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
757. Id. at 87 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
758. Id. at 86 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
759. Id. at 89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (quoting Miller v. Albright, 523
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of a historic regime that left women with [the] responsibility, and freed men
from [the] responsibility, for nonmarital children. 7 60  Thus, what the
majority saw as a biological difference, the dissenters saw as an overbroad
stereotypical gender based generalization. Given this view of the underlying
facts and policies, the classification would not have survived even rational
basis review under Reed v. Reed and its progeny.76' Indeed, Justice
O'Connor cited Reed for the proposition that since "[t]he different statutory
treatment [was] solely on account of the sex of the similarly situated
individuals," the classification was "patently inconsistent with the promise
of equal protection of the laws. 762
V. CONCLUSION
The application of intermediate scrutiny in gender cases has proved
problematic in practice. Nguyen is the only gender case in which all nine
Justices unequivocally applied the standard. Even in that case, the Court was
closely divided as to its proper application. Despite theoretical differences
between intermediate scrutiny and rational basis review, all of the gender
cases are explainable on rational basis grounds. The reality is that
intermediate scrutiny is nothing more than rational basis review
masquerading in intermediate scrutiny clothing. Even under rational basis
review, the Court is required to engage in a reasoned analysis to determine
whether there are reasons, real or plausible, to support a classification, and
whether they are reasonably or rationally related to some constitutionally
legitimate purpose. The fundamental holding in the gender cases, either
expressly or implicitly, is that classifications based on realistic differences
between men and women are reasonable, rational, and constitutionally
legitimate, and those that are based on stereotypes or are otherwise
unnecessary and gratuitous are unreasonable, irrational, and constitutionally
U.S. 420, 482 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
760. Id. at 92 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
761. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (striking down an overbroad gender-based
generalization as being arbitrary). See also source cited supra note 360. However, in Nguyen, Justice
O'Connor said that "an impermissible stereotype may enjoy empirical support and thus be in some
sense 'rational."' Nguyen 533 U.S. at 89. In addition, in Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998), she
stated that "[ilt is unlikely in [her] opinion that any gender classification based on stereotypes can
survive heighten scrutiny, but under rational basis scrutiny a statute may be defended based on
generalized classifications unsupported by empirical evidence." Id. at 452 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). To the extent that these assertions were intended to say that gender based stereotypes
can survive rational basis review, they are inconsistent with the precedents that have struck down
gender based stereotypes applying the rational basis test. See supra notes 340-52, 398-421 and
accompanying text. See also supra notes 263-70 and accompanying text. Thus, despite Justice
O'Connor's assertions, there is ample authority to support the proposition that overbroad gender-
based generalizations and stereotypes are not reasonable, rational, or legitimate.
762. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 86 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Cf. supra note 761.
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illegitimate. Of course, whether a classification is based on a real difference,
or a stereotype, or is otherwise gratuitous, depends on how the individual
Justices view the underlying facts and policies. In this regard, the
verbalization of the standard of review as "substantially related to important
governmental objectives" has had little effect on the outcome of the cases.
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